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Introduction 
This document presents introductory information gathered on a wide range of neighborhood 
revitalization initiatives.  In developing the list of initiatives to research, we began with the following 
list provided by the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation: 
 
• HOPE VI 
• Smart Growth America 
• Homeownership Zones (HOZ) 
• Comprehensive Community Revitalization Program (CCRP) 
• Asset-Based Community Development 
• Health Neighborhoods Initiative 
• Neighborhood Preservation Initiative 
• Category B Pilot Program 
 
We then solicited additional ideas from among Abt staff and consultants active in the community 
development field.  We also conducted a search for foundations that fund national community 
revitalization programs.  In identifying additional initiatives to research, we restricted our search to 
major revitalization efforts that have taken place on a national (or multi-city) level in the last 10 
years.  (An exception is the Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization Program, which we included 
because is a large-scale local effort that has served as a model for other local initiatives.) Based on 
these criteria, we identified the following additional revitalization efforts: 
 
• Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Communities (EZ/EC) 
• Community Development Block Grant Neighborhood Revitalization Strategies (CDBG) 
• Community Outreach Partnership Program (COPC) 
• Living Cities 
• Neighborhood and Family Initiative  
• Rebuilding Communities/Making Connections 
• Pew Partnership Small Cities Initiative 
• Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization Program (NRP) 
 
Given the short time frame of this review, most of our research has focused on evaluation reports and 
other sources of information publicly available via the Internet, as well as studies conducted in-house. 
The following initiatives also have additional information through in-depth telephone interviews with 
experts:  
 
• Comprehensive Community Revitalization Program (CCRP);  
• Rebuilding Communities Initiative (RCI);  
• Making Connections (MC);  
• Neighborhood and Family Initiative (NFI);  
• Neighborhood Preservation Initiative (NPI);  
• Category B Pilot Program; 
• Baltimore Healthy Neighborhoods Initiative (HNI); and  
• Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization Program (NRP). 
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The remainder of this document is organized as follows.  The next section provides a context for 
interpreting the information provided and suggests issues to consider in identifying program models 
for further research in the next phase of the project.  We then present a matrix that summarizes the 
initiatives reviewed along several basic dimensions.  The matrix is followed by more detailed 
information on each of the initiatives, including evaluation findings and lessons learned where 
available.  The final section of the document provides references for each initiative. 
 
Overview of Neighborhood Revitalization Initiatives  
The initiatives reviewed in this document are extremely diverse in scale, goals, and approach.  For 
example, the initial list included HOPE VI, a $5 billion federal initiative aimed at redeveloping 
distressed public housing developments, CCRP, a $10 million effort focused on CDC capacity-
building in four neighborhoods of the South Bronx, and Smart Growth America, a coalition of 
advocacy organizations promoting smart growth principles.  Given the diversity of the initiatives 
reviewed, and the descriptive nature of much of the information presented, it is premature at this stage 
to extract overall lessons learned.   
 
What type of neighborhood is being targeted? 
An important consideration in comparing and evaluating neighborhood revitalization models is the 
type of neighborhood being targeted.  A common theme among revitalization efforts is that the more 
distressed the neighborhood, the larger the investment required, both in terms of the level of resources 
invested and the time frame for realizing neighborhood change.  In turn, the level of investment may 
influence the leadership and organizational structure of the initiative.  For example, large-scale 
revitalization efforts typically require significant public investment and partnerships beyond the 
immediate neighborhood.   
 
The specific attributes of the target neighborhood also affect the choice of revitalization strategies.  
For example, Paul Brophy has argued that in “weak market” locations, that is, places where 
population loss is the primary threat to neighborhood stability, the revitalization strategy should 
include homeownership programs designed to attract middle income households to the community 
and flexible financing tools to support the development of mixed-income housing (Brophy and 
Burnett, 2003).  As another example, initiatives that focus on small towns and rural communities—
such as those involved in the Pew Partnership Small Cities Initiative—are likely to employ different 
tools than those in inner cities (although there is increasing interest in examining common ground 
between the two settings).1   
 
In general, neighborhoods that already have a mixed-income character are believed to have important 
advantages over purely low-income communities as targets for revitalization, because they are 
attractive to developers and to both public and private investors.  However, many of the initiatives 
reviewed target distressed low-income neighborhoods.  HOPE VI, EZ/EC, and Homeownership 
                                                     
1  For example, the Community Development Partnership Collaborative has launched an initiative to analyze 
the characteristics of “remote urban” and “remote rural” communities to identify where there may be 
common ground for collaborative community development activities.  (See http://www.cdpn.org.)    
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Zones, for example, use large-scale investment to address major physical, social, and economic 
problems and encourage a greater mix of incomes in blighted areas.  Several non-federal initiatives, 
such as CCRP and Living Cities, also target high-poverty neighborhoods.  However, the scale of the 
neighborhoods – in terms of both population and area – is quite different among the programs.  Other 
initiatives, such as Healthy Neighborhoods, the Neighborhood Preservation Initiative, and to some 
extent the Minneapolis NRP, focus on neighborhoods that are still functioning but at risk of decline.  
In such neighborhoods, an effective strategy may be small-scale investment that builds off existing 
assets to retain existing stakeholders and attract new buyers to the neighborhood.  An important next 
step in gaining a richer understanding of the most promising initiatives will be to develop a more 
precise taxonomy of the types of neighborhoods being served and the revitalization tools that have 
been found to be most effective for each neighborhood type. 
 
What is the revitalization focus and leadership structure? 
In addition to targeting different neighborhood types, the initiatives reviewed fund different types of 
activities.  For example, HOPE VI, Homeownership Zones, Healthy Neighborhoods, and Living 
Cities, represent largely housing-based strategies, while CCRP, the Neighborhood and Family 
Initiative (NFI), and the Neighborhood Preservation Initiative, have a broader program focus that 
includes economic and human capital development as well.  In addition the types of activities being 
funded, and the range of those activities—from discrete projects to programs aimed at comprehensive 
change—the initiatives use different vehicles to effect change.  For example, some initiatives focus 
on capacity-building of community institutions, including CDCs and community residents, to carry 
out a range of community development activities, while others are primarily project-focused, with 
capacity-building as a secondary goal. 
 
Related to the goal of capacity-building, sponsors of national revitalization efforts need to consider 
what the local leadership structure will be, including the number of lead organizations, the type of 
organization, and the evolution of leadership roles over time.  The initiatives reviewed here represent 
a range of leadership structures—including initiatives led by one or more “strong” CDCs (CCRP), 
new collaborative structures between local foundations, community-based organizations, and 
residents (NFI), and resident-driven efforts (Healthy Neighborhoods, Minneapolis NRP).  A common 
theme across initiatives, however, is the importance of having a “champion” to mobilize resources 
and implement the vision and meaningful participation by community residents (Promising 
Strategies, 2002).  Another theme is that institutionalizing partnerships and leadership structures takes 
many years. 
 
What is the framework for measuring outcomes and neighborhood impact?  
Many of the initiatives reviewed have struggled with developing outcome and impact measurements 
that are both meaningful and have the support of local stakeholders.  Initiatives that are housing-based 
tend to focus on housing production figures, while capacity-building efforts often tend to devote 
significant attention to process outcomes.  Relatively few initiatives have been able to measure 
neighborhood impact.  Challenges in measuring neighborhood impact include few sources of 
quantifiable, systematic, and timely data with which to proxy neighborhood improvement; a wide 
range in the scale and characteristics of neighborhoods being targeted, sometimes even within the 
same initiative; and the interaction of multiple and overlapping revitalization initiatives.  In addition 
to neighborhood impact, measures that address the cost effectiveness of a given initiative, such as 
investment per person impacted, are seldom reported. 
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Summary Matrix of Literature Review Findings 
Note: The matrix does not include Smart Growth America or Asset-Based Community Development because these are concepts shaping neighborhood revitalization 
initiatives rather than direct neighborhood efforts.  It also does not include Neighborhood Reinvestment’s Pilot B project. Descriptions of these concepts are provided 
in the final section of the document. 
 
Federal Initiatives 
Name Sponsor Goal Strategy/Tools Neighborhood Type Funding 
HOPE VI HUD Revitalization of distressed 
public housing and surrounding 
neighborhoods 
Focus on public housing 
revitalization with expected 
spillover effect on neighborhood 
Distressed urban areas  
(usually single neighborhoods)  
1993-2002: 193 grants, $5 billion 
(~$26 million per site); funds 
typically expended in 5-10 years 
EZ/EC HUD Comprehensive revitalization of 
disadvantaged urban and rural 
communities 
Creation of economic 
opportunity through a range of 
physical, economic, and human 
capital development strategies 
Distressed urban and rural areas 
(may be multiple neighborhoods) 
72 designated EZ/ECs in 1994; 
funding ranged from $3 million 
(60 sites) to $100 million or 
more (8 sites)  
HOZ HUD Revitalization of blighted 
neighborhoods by development 
of HO units 
Provide seed money to develop 
HO units, improve infrastructure, 
and provide direct assistance to 
buyers  
Distressed urban areas  
(usually single neighborhoods) 
$50 million awarded to 12 sites 
in two funding rounds (1996 and 
1997) (~$4 million per site)   
CDBG HUD Community revitalization 
through locally-defined housing 
and economic development 
programs 
Broad range activities 
determined at local level.  Some 
incentives for comprehensive 
strategies. 
Type of neighborhood targeted is 
at the discretion of the local 
jurisdiction 
In 2002, funding averaged $2.9 
million per eligible city or county 
and $25 million per state.   
COPC HUD Community revitalization 
through university community 
partnerships 
Funding used outreach, technical 
assistance, and a range of 
community development projects 
developed by universities and 
nonprofit partners. 
Single neighborhoods near 
universities; believed to be 
mainly distressed neighborhoods 
$45 million since 1994 to 97 
grantees (~ $450k per grantee); 
three-year grant term. 
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Foundation-Sponsored and Other Non-Federal Initiatives 
Name Sponsor Goal Strategy/Tools Neighborhood Type Funding 
CCRP Surdna Foundation 
plus many other 
funders 
CDC capacity-building 
to effect neighborhood 
change; focus beyond 
housing on 
comprehensive change 
Four strong CDCs funded to 
develop and implement 
comprehensive revitalization 
plans (beyond housing) 
Distressed urban areas  
(four large neighborhoods 
with significant prior 
investment) 
 
Surdna made initial grant of 
$3 million, followed by $9.4 
million from more than 20 
public and private funders 
Living Cities NCDI (collaborative 
of foundations, HUD, 
private corporations, 
and national 
intermediaries—
LISC and Enterprise)  
CDC capacity-building 
to effect neighborhood 
change 
Funds used to support real 
estate development by CDCs, 
human capital development 
programs through 
CDC/community 
partnerships, and CDC 
capacity-building 
Distressed urban areas  
(neighborhoods all have a 
LISC presence)  
$254 million in loans/grants 
from NCDI between 1991 
and 2001 to 23 cities (~$11 
million per city); $118 
million invested since 2001 
Healthy Neigh-
borhoods 
City-specific 
public/private 
partnership 
Housing- and asset-based 
revitalization 
Housing-based strategy 
focused on resident (rather 
than CDC) leadership and 
asset-based approach; main 
tools are incentives for 
homeownership and small-
scale physical improvements 
to attract people to the 
neighborhood. 
 
Weak but still functioning 
urban neighborhoods  
(began in Battle Creek, MI; 
now in Baltimore and several 
other cities) 
Baltimore: $3 million from 
HUD and $10 million from 
non-federal sources. 
NFI Ford Foundation Creation of community 
“collaboratives” to effect 
neighborhood change; 
focus beyond housing on 
comprehensive change 
Range of physical, economic, 
and human capital 
development programs; some 
funds earmarked for 
traditional development 
projects.  Most programs 
small-scale and 
complementary rather than 
“comprehensive” 
Distressed urban areas 
(poverty rates range from 
29% – 52%) 
$3 million per site for 
operations and programs, 
plus dedicated support for TA 
and evaluation and $3 million 
investment fund for 
development projects.  Four 
sites, 10-year program. 
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Name Sponsor Goal Strategy/Tools Neighborhood Type Funding 
Rebuilding 
Communities 
Annie E. Casey 
Foundation 
Build capacity of 
neighborhoods to change 
their communities into 
safe and supportive 
places 
Capacity-building strategy 
focused on developing 
resident power, improving 
housing and infrastructure, 
increased local collaboration.  
Funding flowed through a 
lead CBO in each 
neighborhood. 
Neighborhoods with some 
assets but in decline  
(plus an existing 
revitalization effort)  
$15 million over 3 years 
across 5 sites ($3 million per 
sites); 7-year demonstration 
Making 
Connections 
Annie E. Casey 
Foundation 
Improving the lives of 
families and children in 
“tough” neighborhoods 
Capacity-building strategy 
tries to increase collaboration 
among local agencies; 
development and analysis of 
data on neighborhoods assets; 
AECF provides technical 
assistance 
Neighborhoods with some 
assets but in decline 
Total funding not known; 10-
year initiative that started in 
1999; 22 cities 
Neighborhood 
Preservation 
Initiative 
Pew Charitable 
Trusts 
Revitalizing and capacity 
building in working-class 
neighborhoods 
Small investments to prevent 
decline; capacity-building of 
local agencies to sustain 
community development; 
visible results are 
emphasized; programs in 
crime prevention, economic 
opportunity, physical 
revitalization, and youth 
development.  Led by a 
foundation in each city. 
Weak but still functioning 
urban neighborhoods 
Pew gave grants of up to 
$800k per city to 9 cities 
(total of $6.6 million) over 3 
years.  In addition, the local 
foundations in each city (the 
grantees) were required to 
obtain a 50% match. 
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Name Sponsor Goal Strategy/Tools Neighborhood Type Funding 
Small Cities 
Initiative 
Pew Charitable 
Trusts 
Determining how 
communities create civic 
change using small cities 
as a guide 
Evaluating the community 
planning process in small 
communities, each with 
discrete local projects; 
programs included human 
capital development, 
economic development, and 
housing.  Small city focus 
believed to be a good way to 
observe change processes 
that could be applied to all 
cities.   
Small cities (populations 
between 50,000 and 
100,000); includes rural 
areas; not clear how 
distressed 
$6 million total: 14 cities 
allocated up to $400k for a 
three-year period; 8 cities got 
an additional $50,000 for one 
more year. 
Minneapolis 
Neighborhood 
Revitalization 
Program 
City of Minneapolis Comprehensive resident-
driven revitalization of 
city neighborhoods  
Building organizational 
capacity of residents and 
neighborhoods to create 
housing, jobs, and 
community spaces.  More 
than 50% of funding has to 
be spent on housing.  
Different levels of funding 
are allocated to different 
neighborhood types. 
Participating neighborhoods 
are divided into 3 types 
“protection” (few problems); 
“revitalization” 
(fundamentally sound but 
beginning to experience 
problems); and “redirection” 
(serious problems) 
$20 million per year for 20 
years, totaling $400 million; 
81 participating 
neighborhoods (includes all 
city neighborhoods); funding 
varies by neighborhood. 
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Review of Neighborhood Revitalization Initiatives 
HOPE VI 
Sponsor Organization:  U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
 
Target: Distressed public housing developments, typically in troubled inner-city neighborhoods. 
 
Approach:  Created by Congress in 1993 to address the problem of severely distressed public 
housing.  Program involves large-scale demolition and redevelopment of public housing developments, 
typically of more than 300 units.  Redevelopment can be either through rehab or new construction.  
Broader neighborhood revitalization is an increasingly important program goal, but the program has 
historically focused on the physical redevelopment of public housing and the provision of supportive 
services to public housing residents, not on economic development or infrastructure improvements in 
the surrounding neighborhoods.  HOPE VI developments are typically located in seriously distressed 
neighborhoods. 
 
Program provides planning and implementation grants to local housing agencies through an annual 
NOFA process.  Grants were originally capped at $50 million, now capped at $20 million.  National 
average of total development costs for HOPE VI projects (housing-related expenses only) is $117,920 
per unit (Khadduri, et al, 2003). 
 
Key Revitalization Activities and Tools:  Early HOPE VI plans focused on replacing existing public 
housing with new public housing units and creating a broader range of incomes by increasing the 
share of working public housing residents.  The program’s goals and tools have evolved over time, 
and since 1996 HUD has emphasized: 
 
• Mixed-financed, mixed-income development, including creating communities that blend public 
housing units with market-rate units and units financed by the low-income housing tax credit; 
• Adherence to “new urbanism” principles and attention to neighborhood-wide redevelopment; 
• Public-private partnerships and leveraging of funds; and 
• Homeownership.   
 
Partners, Funders, and Resources:  Between 1993 and 2002, HUD funded 193 HOPE VI 
revitalization grants, totaling just over $5 billion.  An additional $308 million funded 35 planning grants 
and 177 demolition grants.   
 
Over time, grant amounts have become smaller and leveraging has increased:  
  
• In 1993, HOPE VI grants were capped at $50 million; in 2001, the maximum grant was $35 
million; in 2002 it was $20 million.   
 
• Most projects use a variety of public and private funding sources in addition to HOPE VI, 
including: HUD public housing capital funds; tax credit equity; city and county funds; private 
mortgage financing, and Federal Home Loan Bank.  Across 11 early HOPE VI grantees, 58 
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percent of total project costs were funded by HOPE VI and 42 percent were funded from other 
private and public sources (Holin, forthcoming). 
 
Outcomes and Evaluation Findings:  We have little systematic data about the neighborhood 
revitalization outcomes of HOPE VI, although there is considerable anecdotal evidence that HOPE VI 
can trigger or complement broader revitalization efforts, affecting the “extent and pace” of 
neighborhood change (Zielenbach, 2002).  HOPE VI developments tend to be located in very 
distressed neighborhoods, so revitalization of these neighborhoods is likely to be a long-term process. 
 
• A recent study of eight HOPE VI neighborhoods (Zielenbach, 2002) found increases in income, 
employment, and education levels of residents of HOPE VI neighborhoods between 1990 and 
2000, as well as a reduction in crime.  However, it is not clear the extent to which the 
neighborhood changes were caused by HOPE VI versus other factors such as strong regional 
economies; development efforts of local community groups; welfare reform; and targeted 
infusions of city, state, and other federal resources.  Most of the neighborhoods were subject to 
these other forces.  Also, as of 2000 several of the developments evaluated were not yet complete 
and fully reoccupied, so it may be premature to study their impact on the neighborhood. 
 
• No studies are yet available isolating the impact of HOPE VI on local property values.  A new 
Abt study examines changes in property values in two HOPE VI neighborhoods—New Haven 
and San Francisco—at different stages of the redevelopment process.  A similar study by the 
Urban Institute of three HOPE VI neighborhoods has not been released by HUD. 
 
• Program is not one-size-fits all.  Program tries to balance goals of 1) providing quality housing 
for as many low-income people as possible and 2) exerting a positive influence on the 
surrounding neighborhood against local market conditions.  In weak markets, HOPE VI sites that 
created all-new mixed income developments (vs. rehab and public housing-only developments) 
have been most successful in bringing new private investment to the surrounding area. 
 
Empowerment Zones/Enterprise Communities (EZ/EC) 
Sponsor Organization:  U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
 
Target: Comprehensive revitalization of disadvantaged urban and rural communities 
 
Approach:  Created in 1993 to encourage comprehensive planning and investment aimed at 
economic, physical, and social development of disadvantaged urban and rural areas.  The program 
built on lessons learned from earlier community revitalization efforts and involved a number of 
innovative features: 
 
• Local design 
• Community participation 
• Comprehensive and long-term approach to revitalization 
• Building community capacity 
• Use of local benchmarking to foster accountability 
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Each funded community’s efforts at zone transformation were expected to reflect four key principles: 
 
• Economic opportunity 
• Community-based partnerships 
• Sustainable community development, and 
• A strategic vision for change. 
 
Under the initial round of funding announced in December 1994, 71 urban sites received 
EZ/EC designation. The EZ/EC designation was for 10 years.  The major share of the federal funding 
went to the six sites designated as Empowerment Zones (EZs) and the remaining funds went to 
Enterprise Communities (ECs).   
 
Key Revitalization Activities and Tools:  EZ/EC sites conduct a broad array of “sustainable 
community development” activities, including a variety of human services and education activities, 
physical improvement projects, housing and health initiatives, and public safety efforts. 
 
Partners, Funders, and Resources:  EZ/EC communities were given access to a variety of forms of 
funding.  The two most common forms of federal assistance were Title XX Social Services Block 
Grant Funds (Title XX) and tax-exempt bond financing.  Other sources of funding were 
empowerment zone employment credits, increased Section 179 expensing, economic development 
initiative (EDI) grants, and priority in other federal assistance programs.  The level of funding varied 
by EZ/EC designation: 
 
• Six Empowerment Zones (EZs) received a commitment of $100 million in Title XX funds and 
access to employment tax credits, increased Section 179 expensing, and new tax-exempt bond 
financing; 
• Two Supplemental Empowerment Zones (SEZs) received EDI grants of $125 million and $87 
million, respectively, as well as Title XX funds and tax-exempt bond financing; 
• Four Enhanced Enterprise Communities (EECs) received a $22 million EDI grant (and a 
matching authorization under the Section 108 loan guarantee program), plus $3 million in Title 
XX funds and new tax-exempt bond financing. 
• Sixty Enterprise Communities (ECs) received $3 million in Title XX funds and new tax-exempt 
bond financing. 
 
Outcomes and Evaluation Findings:  HUD sponsored an evaluation in 2001 of the 71 EZ/EC sites 
funded in 1994, including intensive study of 6 EZs and 12 ECs (Hebert, 2001).  The evaluation found 
mixed outcomes in key program areas: 
 
Program Area Positive Impact of EZ/EC Little or no Impact of EZ/EC 
Business and 
Employment 
Growth 
• Job growth occurred in five of the six EZs. 
• Job growth in four of the six EZs outpaced 
job growth in comparison and contiguous 
areas.  (Two EZs did worse than their 
comparison areas.)   
• The number of EZ residents employed in 
EZ businesses and the number of both EZ 
resident- and minority-owned businesses 
increased substantially across the six EZs. 
• In only three of the six EZs were increases 
in employment correlated with specific EZ 
programmatic activities. Moreover, in 
some of the EZs, such as Atlanta, 
employment increases may have been 
attributable to non-EZ activities. 
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Program Area Positive Impact of EZ/EC Little or no Impact of EZ/EC 
EZ Initiatives and 
Business and 
Workforce 
Outcomes 
• Business and workforce development 
activities were widespread across the 18 
EZ/EC intensive study sites, and business 
owners in the EZ sites reported that the 
climate for doing business in their zones 
had improved. 
• Workforce development activities placed 
as many as 16,000 EZ/EC residents in 
jobs, both inside and outside of the 
EZ/ECs in the 18 intensive study sites. 
• EZs continue to struggle with the special 
challenges of placing the long-term 
unemployed in jobs.  
• Businesses in the six EZs made only 
limited use of the program’s Federal tax 
incentives, and a majority of the 
businesses using tax incentives reported 
that the credit was of little or no 
importance in affecting their hiring or 
investing decisions. 
• 65 percent of EZ businesses surveyed 
reported no benefits from being in the EZ. 
Community 
Participation and 
Partnerships 
• Federal requirements for citizen 
participation increased opportunities for 
residents and community organizations to 
be involved in the EZ/EC decision-making 
process. 
• Extensive private and State and local 
government resources were leveraged as 
part of local EZ/EC Initiative activities. 
• Citizen participation in EZ/EC initiative 
decision-making generally decreased from 
the strategic planning process to the 
program implementation stage.  
• Programs relied heavily on engagement 
with nonprofit and private partners. 
Creating and maintaining partnerships 
required significant time and effort. 
Building capacity within community 
organizations to undertake such long-term 
partnerships requires special attention, but 
not many sites invested heavily in such 
efforts. 
 
The evaluation also offered the following lessons learned regarding the program’s principles of 
sustainable community development and strategic vision for change: 
 
Sustainable Community Development 
 
• How the study sites defined “sustainable community development” reflected their funding levels 
and grant terms: 
 
- EZ sites explicitly designed their programs to be 10-year efforts, and received funding ($100 
million in Title XX funds) somewhat commensurate with that time frame. Accordingly, many 
of the “sustainable community development” projects at these sites are seen as long-term 
efforts, and are ongoing.  
 
- EC sites received $3 million in Title XX funds and, despite the federal view that they were 
making a commitment to a ten-year initiative, most designed their programs on a 3-to-5-year 
time frame.   
 
• Networks of nonprofits have allowed the zone programs to offer a more varied array of services 
and to reach a broader population base.  Sites have relied on nonprofits to a significant level to 
carry out their sustainable community development program activities, and to a greater extent 
than they did for their economic opportunity activities.  
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• A few ECs will leave behind such new institutions to continue to carry out all or part of their zone 
mission, but, overall, the ECs have made only a limited investment in building the capacity of 
nonprofit agencies, in part because of their shorter time perspective on the EZ/EC Initiative. 
 
• There has been somewhat more effort in this regard among the EZ sites, but overall, most EZ 
sites have viewed nonprofit organizations primarily as service providers rather than as strategic 
investments to build long-term community capacity. 
 
• EZ/EC sites that tried to build the capacity of their local nonprofit network have recognized how 
challenging this task can be, and acknowledge that it often requires a long-term commitment and 
considerable resources to achieve even basic functioning in new nonprofit organizations.  Further, 
each time a nonprofit organization takes on a new function, additional technical assistance may 
be required.  
 
Strategic Vision for Change 
 
The designers of the EZ/EC program believed a strategic, long-term vision for change was necessary 
to achieve successful revitalization of distressed communities. Although it is still largely anecdotal, 
evidence has emerged from the study that confirms the value of having a local strategic vision: 
 
• Communities with a clearer strategic vision of comprehensive change, and one that could be 
effectively communicated to affected stakeholders, were in fact more likely to be successful at 
mobilizing support and in achieving progress in their zone activities.  
 
- It is important that the vision be more than just an articulation of themes or concepts; it needs 
to provide a guide for how the vision will be operationalized in specific programs and 
activities. 
 
- Communities in which the vision lacked strategic clarity, or where the strategic plan failed to 
describe mechanisms for implementing the vision’s basic concepts, often experienced delays 
and diffusion of effort, and missed opportunities to leverage other resources. 
 
• In many of the intensive study sites, the level of resident understanding of the zone mission 
declined over time, illustrating the difficulty of establishing and maintaining a broadly understood 
and shared community revitalization strategy. 
 
Homeownership Zones (HOZ) 
Sponsor Organization:  U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
 
Target: Revitalizing blighted neighborhoods through the construction of entire neighborhoods of new 
single-family homes. 
 
Approach:  Beginning in Fiscal Year 1996, HUD began offering seed money for communities to 
revitalize vacant and blighted properties. Through a competitive funding process, six cities in 1996 
and an additional six in 1997 were awarded several million dollars to reclaim brownfields and other 
distressed neighborhoods. Communities then use HUD money to help leverage additional investment 
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in the area by creating entire new neighborhoods of new, single-family homes (Homeownership 
Zones). Communities are encouraged to plan for mixed-income and mixed-use developments, with 
pedestrian-friendly atmospheres that make use of public transportation. Homeownership Zones 
generally make up several hundred new housing units close to major employment centers. 
 
Key Revitalization Activities and Tools:  Eligible activities differ by funding year. FY96 grantees 
were given Section 108 loan guarantees in addition to their basic grant. The grants had to be used to 
strengthen these loan guarantees or the projects where the loans were used. 
 
FY96 grantees could use their funds for: 
• Property acquisition 
• Housing rehabilitation 
• Site preparation 
• Special economic development activities, including new housing construction with CDBG. 
 
FY97 grantees could use their funds for: 
• Property acquisition 
• Housing construction or rehabilitation 
• Site preparation 
• Direct financial assistance to homebuyers 
• Homeownership counseling 
• Construction of public improvements to complement the HOZ 
• Administrative costs (up to 5% of total grant) 
 
Partners, Funders, and Resources:  In the FY96 funding cycle, HUD provided $30 million in EDI 
funds to support $54 million in Section 108 loan guarantees. In the FY97 funding cycle, HUD 
provided $20 million in recaptured Nehemiah Grant funds. Unsuccessful applicants in the FY97 cycle 
were given technical assistance through HUD’s College of Experts program.  No funding has been 
available since FY97. 
 
Outcomes or Evaluation Findings: No evaluation of this project has been completed.  
 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)  
Sponsor Organization:  U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
 
Target: Community revitalization through housing and economic development programs for low- to 
moderate-income households 
 
Approach:  Created in 1974, CDBG allocates federal funding to states, cities, and urban counties 
according to a formula based on population, poverty, age of the housing stock, and other needs 
factors.  The program has a common goal of “reducing disparities in well-being among 
neighborhoods,” but specific goals and strategies are at the discretion of local communities. 
 
In 1995, HUD provided additional incentives (such as reduced reporting burdens) to cities and 
counties (not states) that designed “comprehensive community revitalization strategies” (HUD Notice 
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CPD-96-01).  HUD defined successful neighborhood revitalization strategies as those that “bring 
together the neighborhood’s and the larger community’s stakeholders to forge partnerships” that: 
 
• Obtain commitments to neighborhood building; 
• Make neighborhoods attractive for investment 
• Generate neighborhood participation; 
• Support the use of neighborhood intermediary institutions; and 
• Foster the growth of resident-based initiatives.   
 
Further, HUD specified that the strategies should show “substantial improvements” in the 
neighborhood and “create meaningful opportunities for residents” during a 5-year time frame, 
although the neighborhood does not have to be fully revitalized within that period. 
 
HUD suggested that grantees develop benchmarks for performance measurement but did not specify 
the benchmarks. 
 
Key Revitalization Activities and Tools:  Activities and tools vary according to local strategy.  
Eligible activities include: acquisition/disposition of real property; public improvements and facilities 
(e.g., senior citizens center, recreation center, day care center); clearance; public services (e.g., child 
care, health care, job training/education programs, recreation programs, drug abuse 
counseling/treatment, and services for homeless persons); interim assistance; relocation 
payments/assistance; rehabilitation of residential, commercial/industrial, or other nonprofit owned, 
nonresidential buildings; historic preservation; lead based paint hazard evaluation and reduction; code 
enforcement; special economic development; assistance to microenterprises; homeownership 
assistance; urban renewal completion; technical assistance to increase capacity of public/private non-
profits; assistance to institutions of higher education; and program administration costs related to 
planning and execution of CDBG assisted activities. 
 
Partners, Funders, and Resources:  Funding is allocated annually by block grant formula to states, 
cities, and counties.  In 2002, HUD allocated $1.3 billion across 50 states and Puerto Rico (average of 
$25 million per state), and $3 billion to 1,041 cities and counties (average of $2.9 million per 
city/county). 
 
Outcomes or Evaluation Findings:  2002 Urban Institute study of the impact of CDBG spending on 
urban neighborhoods (Walker, 2002) analyzed neighborhood outcomes in 17 cities between 1994 and 
1997.  The study focused on neighborhoods in which the average annual spending per poor person 
was at least $86,737 and cities that included a range of neighborhood types.   
 
The study found that CDBG spending had a positive impact on three of four indicators studied: 
median loan amount, loan approval rate, and number of business establishments.  CDBG spending 
had a negative impact on the number of loan applications.  There are some significant caveats to these 
findings: 
 
• The study was not specific to communities that created comprehensive community revitalization 
strategies, nor did it specify the particular CDBG interventions being funded or take into account 
previous CDBG-funded activity, other public investments in the community, and broader regional 
economic trends; 
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• The study sample of 17 cities was not nationally representative and including neighborhoods 
receiving less than $87,737 per poor resident might have changed results; and 
• Interviews with local respondents yielded mixed results: local informants agreed with just 27% of 
the researchers’ categorizations of neighborhood performance. 
 
Community Outreach Partnership Center Program (COPC) 
Sponsor Organization:  U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
 
Target: Community revitalization through university-community partnerships. 
 
Approach:  The COPC program fosters and evaluates collaborations between universities and their 
communities.  HUD started the program in 1994 to engage college and universities in community 
development.  This program assumes that in order for university involvement in a community to be 
successful, mutually beneficial partnerships must be formed with the community. This proved to be 
challenging. Activities were generally designed to provide assistance or support to nonprofit agencies 
in the community, which in turn provided assistance to community residents. 
 
Key Revitalization Activities and Tools:  COPC has supported a broad range of community 
development activities, including physical development and improvement of housing and community 
facilities; educational programs; life skills training; workforce development; economic development; 
community planning; community development technical assistance and training; community service; 
legal and health services; and information technology.  
 
Partners, Funders, and Resources:  HUD was the primary sponsor of this initiative, though 
universities and community groups leveraged additional funding in their communities.  HUD invested 
approximately $45 million in the COPC program since 1994, funding more than 100 colleges and 
universities.  This money acted as seed money for university-community partnerships to leverage 
additional funding for community development initiatives.   
 
Outcomes or Evaluation Findings:  HUD sponsored an evaluation of the COPC program conducted 
by the Urban Institute in 2002.  The main findings were as follows:  
 
• The most successful projects were those in which students participated in the community 
outreach as part of their coursework and when faculty members acted in a technical 
assistance capacity. 
• The least successful projects were those that attempted to provide coursework for community 
residents and applied research projects. 
• Among the sample site projects attempted, participants considered 67% of projects at least 
partially successful. 
• Participants considered 45% of activities undertaken to be fully successful. 
• Only 10% of projects completely failed or never got started. 
 
 
Additional lessons learned related to the process of institutionalizing university-community 
partnerships: 
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• Institutionalizing these relationships takes longer than the three years HUD’s program allows. 
Many of the COPC partners requested no-cost extensions to help their programs continue to 
develop. Partnerships with little history prior to the COPC grant had the most trouble in 
institutionalizing their efforts. 
• The economic stability of the university has a significant impact on the success of 
institutionalization.  Universities with large endowments tend to have better facilities, better 
paid faculty, and more graduate students with a desire to reach out to the community. 
Universities with more limited finances cannot absorb the additional costs of community 
outreach programs not funded by the COPC grant. 
• Universities with specific administrative offices for coordinating outreach efforts are far more 
successful at institutionalizing community outreach efforts. Centralized offices help 
coordinate and monitor university relations with the community, ensuring a higher standard 
of quality.  
• The participation of key faculty members is an important component of institutionalization. 
Often, adjunct faculty or consultants are typically involved in community outreach but have 
little ability to influence permanent staff members to do the same. It is more important for 
faculty and students to participate in the outreach efforts in order to make it more central to 
the university’s traditions. 
• Self-assessment during the institutionalization process helps sites determine what is working 
and where they should refocus their efforts.  
• Certain disciplines lend themselves better to community outreach more than others. In order 
to sustain larger efforts at outreach, university departments will need to change the way they 
view community outreach, making it a more central part of their curriculum.   
• Both large-scale umbrella-like community development partnerships and smaller project-
level relationships can be effective. 
 
Comprehensive Community Revitalization Program  
Sponsor Organization:  Surdna Foundation and multiple partners 
 
Target: Capacity-building for four housing-based CDCs to address social and economic needs of 
neighborhoods beyond housing.  Attempted to improve the quality of life of low-income people in 
these neighborhoods 
 
Sites: Four neighborhoods in South Bronx, NY; originally covered approximately 250,000 people 
 
Approach:  The Comprehensive Community Revitalization Program (CCRP) was started by the 
Surdna Foundation in 1992 in an effort to turn around the South Bronx, one of the poorest 
neighborhoods in the United States at that time.  CCRP began with a six-year demonstration (1992-
1998) designed to support and strengthen South Bronx CDCs as they developed and tested strategies 
aimed at comprehensive community revitalization.   Six CDCs were invited to participate in the 
demonstration, although two eventually dropped out of the program.  The experiment was to test 
whether CDCs could be effective neighborhood intermediaries capable of directing comprehensive 
community revitalization efforts.   
 
CCRP’s approach is based on several principles common to most comprehensive community 
initiatives (CCIs): 
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• Selection of community-based organizations to take the lead in neighborhood organizing; 
• Strengthening local collaborations and linkages; 
• Improving access to skills training, jobs, and education; 
• Improving social and other services; 
• Boosting economic development; and 
• Addressing environmental concerns. 
 
CCRP is distinct from other CCIs in its: 
 
• Pragmatic approach to comprehensive community development (“doable” projects and quick 
results); 
• Reliance on well-established and entrepreneurial CDCs with proven track records; 
• Modest scale of funding; 
• Approach to directing and managing the demonstration (involvement of CCRP’s Program 
Director in networking and brining in new funding sources); 
• Emphasis on community-based collaboration rather than creating a new neighborhood 
governance structure. 
 
Key Revitalization Activities and Tools:  The CDCs have helped create new jobs, both at the CDCs 
and through private sector employers. The CDCs created the New Bronx Employment Service 
(NBES), a job readiness and placement service. The Neighborhood Employment Program is a 
program at NBES targeted to residents receiving public assistance, using the EarnFair welfare-to-
work curriculum. CCRP also formed the New Bronx Maintenance Company, which provides jobs to 
South Bronx residents and works on both community development and private sector maintenance 
jobs. CCRP also facilitates the Bronx Health Insurance Program, which helps participants enroll in 
Medicaid, Child Health Plus, and Family Health Plus insurance programs.   
 
Leadership Structure:  Four CDCs led the initiative both as lead agencies in their respective 
neighborhoods and as a collaborator in the initiative as a whole. Each of the CDCs had already 
demonstrated capacity to accomplish physical revitalization.  The energy, capacity, and experience of 
the CDC’s Executive Director were the key factors in a CDC’s selection.  CCRP funded two new 
staff people at each CDC – a Project Manager and an Outreach Worker – whose responsibilities were 
entirely CCRP related.  The CDC collaborative reports to a consortium of funders and sets plans 
during monthly meetings of the CDC Executive Directors.  The CDCs selected the target 
neighborhoods, with the advice that neighborhoods should be large enough to be important but small 
enough to be manageable.  The neighborhoods also generally had a significant share of housing. 
CCRP’s coverage area originally encompassed about 250,000 residents, or just over 40,000 residents 
per neighborhood (with the original six CDCs participating).  
 
At the end of the demonstration, the four CDCs entered into a second phase of the program.  The 
CDCs incorporated CCRP Inc. to sustain and expand the progress in their neighborhood.  The CDCs 
in the community controlled an affordable housing portfolio of over $500 million, but needed other 
partners to bring in the infrastructure to help sustain the neighborhood.  When the demonstration 
phase was over, some of the participating CDCs expanded while others downsized. CCRP Inc. has 
remained the supervising intermediary of the initiative since the demonstration phase ended, but its 
existence is uncertain beyond 2003.  Current funding trends do not favor intermediary-led initiatives. 
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Partners, Funders, and Resources:  Surdna Foundation made the first commitment to CCRP of $3 
million in 1991.  Between 1991 and 1998, 20 additional funders contributed an additional $9.4 
million in grants.  Over $100 million in additional funding was leveraged because of CCRP seed 
money. 
 
In addition to Surdna Foundation, funders include: Annie E. Casey Foundation, Chase Manhattan 
Foundation, Citigroup Foundation, Clark Foundation, Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, European 
American Bank, Industrial Bank of Japan, LISC, New York State Department of Health, Office of 
Community Services of HHS, Open Society Institute, SEEDCO/Non-profit Assistance Corp., Pew 
Charitable Trusts, Rockefeller Foundation, Uris Brothers Foundation, and Wells Fargo Foundation. 
 
The New Bronx Maintenance Company was funded through a $200,000 grant from the Office of 
Community Services at HHS and a matched loan from LISC. NBMC’s own revenue will sustain the 
program in the future.  CCRP created a health care center in a neighborhood that had no similar 
services by leveraging.  One funder provided $300,000 as seed money, which they attracted several 
million dollars in leveraged funding. The facilities were housed in two buildings that the CDC already 
owned, with help from some city organizations and local hospitals. 
 
Outcomes or Evaluation Findings:  CCRP funded an evaluation of the demonstration in 1998 
(Spilka and Burns, 1998).  The evaluation focuses on outcomes related to CDC capacity building.  
Noteworthy neighborhood outcomes (as of 1998) include: 
 
• Almost 400 people have been served by the Bronx Health Insurance Program. 
• The New Bronx Maintenance Company has painted public spaces, fire escapes, and 
apartments in CDC-owned buildings. It will offer its painting, maintenance, and janitorial 
services to businesses outside the South Bronx. 
• The New Bronx Employment Service has placed about 2,000 residents in quality jobs since 
1996. 
• Three CDC-sponsored health care centers were opened in three different neighborhoods. 
• At the end of the demonstration, the four CDCs together created the CCRP Inc. to sustain and 
expand their joint efforts.  The CDCs see CCRP Inc. as critical to their future since they 
believe that neutral and fully-dedicated staff support for current and future shared 
programming is essential. 
 
This program set out to improve the quality of life for poor people in South Bronx neighborhoods. To 
measure changes in quality of life, they looked at new supports that were created, such as childcare, 
jobs, and parks.  The more difficult task was measuring community building. In some sense, this can 
never be definitively measured. CCRP was careful never to take credit for outcomes that were likely 
due to their efforts, but could not be directly linked to CCRP.  For example, crime rates were greatly 
reduced in these neighborhoods during the CCRP demonstration.  CCRP was training and helping to 
employ large numbers of people at this time.  These two events were likely related, but it is difficult 
to prove the relationship. 
 
The evaluators identified a number of lessons learned from the CCRP demonstration. Spilka and 
Burns (1998) provide a very detailed discussion of lessons for other cities, funders, and evaluators.  
Overall, the demonstration showed that large-scale CDCs with strong leadership and solid track 
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records are strong candidates for leading comprehensive initiatives, because they are well-positioned, 
entrepreneurial, and deeply invested in their communities and therefore able to be successful in taking 
on a CCI.  With support, established CDCs can expand their missions and diversify staff and 
programs, and also effectively capture new, stable public and private resources to sustain new 
programs over time. 
 
However, the evaluation also found that the new administrative and staff demands put very significant 
pressures on the already thinly staffed organizations, and that despite their track records, learning to 
work together and being open to constructive criticism did not always come easily for all of the 
CDCs.  As a result,  
 
• Carefully evaluating CDCs’ organizational and administrative capacities and readiness 
to take on these new organizational challenges is very important, as is understanding each 
CDC’s true level of comfort in working collaboratively with outsiders.   
 
• Investment in program-related staff (by CCRP) was critical to CDCs’ abilities to support 
the broader planning and program development activities that established the initiative in 
their neighborhoods and provided the opportunity to build the program knowledge, 
identify new sources of support, and establish stable funding to sustain the broader 
programs that are now in place. 
o Core support of project-dedicated staff is needed not just at start-up but must be 
ongoing to sustain the new broader agendas and increased complexity that come 
with participation in the CCI. 
 
• The demonstration highlighted the critical importance to the overall success of the 
demonstration of finding a seasoned and respected individual to serve as the program 
administrator.  
 
o CCRP’s Program Director played a key role in helping the CDCs link to new 
resources and managing the diverse interests of the CDCs and the funders. 
o For CCIs that have scale, complex domains of activity and numerous grantees, 
providing a full-time program director is essential. 
 
• Early investment in physical planning with a strategic action emphasis can help to put in 
place sound “blueprints” that guided the CDCs as they move toward broader roles in their 
neighborhoods.  
 
o These helped capture the shared vision of residents and other neighborhood 
stakeholders and played an important role in attracting large-scale public and 
private support. 
 
• CDCs must be able to find funding to supplement and replace the core program-related 
support provided by the sponsor organization (CCRP) in order to continue their roles and 
activities at the end of the demonstration. 
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o Since this type of funding is hardest to find, CDCs need to start early to 
strengthen their own fund-aising skills and identify alternative long-term soft 
funding.  
o CDCs must also be prepared to identify new ways of managing their own 
businesses—for example, by gaining higher revenues from their properties and 
negotiating for more overhead on programs and projects—to increase revenue. 
 
• Under the proper conditions and with enough time, CDCs participating in an initiative 
can build a collaborative structure that they value; sustaining the CDC collaborative after 
the demonstration phase ends will require that each of the CDCs demonstrate ownership 
in it and be prepared to support independent staff.  
 
• By creating flexible access to significant amounts of first money, CCRP enabled the 
CDCs to be taken seriously by other funders and investors.  
 
• Collaborative grantmaking was a major advantage: 
 
o With 20 funders each contributing a different amount of resources to CCRP, a 
total pool of $9.4 million was amassed. From this, the CCRP participants raised 
an approximate additional $100 million for CCRP-related efforts. 
 
• It is important for a CCI to set ambitious goals, and at the same time to aim for some 
early and visible results. 
o Long-term objectives were quickly and regularly reinforced through a series of 
concrete, visible projects. These results continued to generate support among 
funders, the CDCs and all in their communities for business that is very hard 
work. 
 
• Funders must be prepared to support initiatives over a long period of time and with large 
amounts of money. 
o At the end of the 6-year demonstration, much was accomplished but much 
remains to be done.  CCIs require building consensus among various interest 
groups and taking on the tougher community problems, which can take a long 
time to work through. 
 
• Effective collaborations can be established between funders and grantees over time, 
provided that the key conditions of mutual respect, shared values and objectives, and 
open communication are present.  
o As with other CCIs, the CCRP partnership did not happen immediately, but only 
after significant testing, negotiating and delivering among all the players 
involved. 
 
• Funders of CCIs need to balance the focus on a single lead agency with those that support 
the development of other organizations.  
o Funders and managers must maintain a concern for overburdening the lead CBOs 
beyond their own expertise and management capacity.  
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o Funders must assess the degree to which the initiative should reach toward a 
broader community building effort if resources are not available to increase 
capacity in other sectors of a community. CCRP made a clear choice in its design 
to focus its limited resources to strengthen the CDC’s capacity to expand its own 
role in accomplishing broader community objectives. 
 
• Residents should be involved at a level that is meaningful to them.  Residents should play 
a role in setting neighborhood goals and priorities and should be involved in the planning 
process. It may not make sense for them to participate in program implementation. 
 
• Business leaders should be involved early in the process.  Earlier involvement by local 
businesses could have facilitated some block initiatives and job creation. 
 
The former director of CCRP has brought this model to Milwaukee and Chicago.  The pilot program 
in Chicago has been so successful that the MacArthur Foundation has chosen to fund an additional 14 
neighborhoods over a ten-year period.  The New Communities Program, as the Chicago CCRP 
initiative is called, is expected to receive nearly $15 million in funding from MacArthur. 
 
 
Living Cities 
Sponsor Organization: The National Community Development Initiative (foundations, nonprofits, 
financial institutions, and federal government) 
 
Target: Troubled inner-city neighborhoods. 
 
Approach: The first decade of the NCDI project was funded in three rounds: 1991-1994, 1994-1997, 
and 1997-2001. The initiative began its second decade in 2001 with plans to continue through 2011. 
Among the various funders involved in the project throughout its existence, some stayed over all 
rounds, and others funded only certain rounds of the initiative. NCDI money is funneled through 
LISC and Enterprise, which act as national intermediaries.  These partners meet semiannually to 
discuss priorities, but NCDI itself has very few staff (2-3) running it, with the intermediaries in 
charge of most administration. High-level executives from the partner organizations are involved in 
these meetings, resulting in quick decision-making abilities.  
 
The goal of NCDI is to build the institutional capacities of CDCs so they can better effect change in 
distressed communities. NCDI funding reaches about 300 CDCs in 23 cities. The cities were chosen 
because one of the intermediaries had a presence in that city and at least one funder had a special 
interest or opportunity in that city. 
 
The new decade (2001-2011) also has 5 funder initiatives it is trying to achieve: 
• A closer examination of public policy issues and how NCDI’s experiences can help shape 
public policy. 
• Improve CDCs’ use of information technology. 
• Increase the leadership capacity of CDCs through a human capital initiative. 
• Increase communication with the nation about what Living Cities has taught NCDI. 
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• A focus on four pilot cities (Twin Cities, Miami, Chicago, Baltimore) to make a deeper 
impact on these cities by strengthening partnerships with community groups. 
 
Key Revitalization Activities and Tools:  Because NCDI funds the activities of CDCs, the initiative 
works primarily in real estate and capacity building. 
 
Real Estate Development and Support. Most CDC activity was in real estate development, primarily 
because CDCs had focused a large part of their work on this area for most of their histories. Real 
estate is generally easier to fund and provides more visible results in the community, thereby 
establishing the legitimacy of the CDC as an agency able to effect change in the community. Real 
estate projects used $174 million in NCDI funding, 91% of which was for up-front, interim financing 
(project design, feasibility studies, property acquisition, etc,) that CDCs had trouble obtaining from 
other sources. 
 
Non-Real Estate Projects. CDCs partnered with local agencies to work on childcare, employment 
training, and community safety initiatives, among others.  
 
Capacity Building. A portion of the technical support, training, and general operating funds for the 
participating CDCs came from NCDI via the local intermediary offices. NCDI money was also used 
to leverage funding from “local operating support collaboratives” to help further support capacity 
building and to create community ownership of the initiatives. Sixty million dollars of NCDI funding 
went toward capacity building. 
 
Partners, Funders, and Resources: NCDI is the overseeing agency for this initiative, which 
supports two national intermediaries: The Local Initiative Support Corporation (LISC) and The 
Enterprise Foundation. These in turn work with hundreds of CDCs in the 23 chosen cities. Its funding 
comes from non-profit foundations, government agencies, and financial institutions (including banks 
and insurance companies). The CDCs also form “local operating support collaboratives,” which are 
local governments, banks, corporations, and foundations that come together to focus local funding 
and resources on CDC development and capacity building.  LISC provides loans, grants, training, and 
technical assistance to CDCs to develop institutional capacity. Enterprise works with PHAs and 
nonprofits in a similar fashion. 
 
Over the first decade, $254,000,000 in loans or grants were used from NCDI to fund efforts at the 
CDCs. The total real estate development costs for projects at least partially funded by NCDI was $2.3 
billion. An additional $5.5 billion was leveraged to do other real estate development in the 23 cities. 
 
Outcomes and Evaluation Findings:  The program was evaluated by the OMG Center for 
Collaborative Learning and the Urban Institute. The study found the following outcomes: 
 
• Each dollar of NCDI funds was leveraged with $2 of other funding in most cities. 
• In addition to the $174 million from NCDI for real estate development, the intermediaries 
raised and committed an additional $261 million. 
• In the 23 cities, 83,849 affordable housing units were built over the decade, of which 24% 
were partially funded by NCDI. 
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• NCDI money was more often used in developing home-ownership units (one-third of all 
NCDI-funded units compared to less than one-sixth of CDC-produced units) compared to the 
overall unit production. 
• NCDI funding produced affordable housing units in 472 projects. 
• 1.6 million square feet of facilities were also produced, including community facilities such 
as health clinics and day-care centers, as well as commercial and industrial space. 
 
NCDI also helped improve CDC capacity, as evidenced by the following results: 
 
• CDCs with good reputations in the NCDI cities increased significantly. 
• The number of CDCs able to produce more than 10 housing units per year nearly doubled in 
each city. 
• More CDCs had the operating budgets to sustain their programs and diversify their activities. 
• The increased use of NCDI funds for long-term CDC funding freed up staff to work on 
projects rather than constantly seeking short-term funding sources. 
• More loans became available for construction in communities where CDCs operated. 
• CDCs were able to improve their neighborhoods so significantly that it impacted the private 
real estate market. Some communities have improved so much that the main concern is 
gentrification. 
 
Healthy Neighborhoods Initiative 
Sponsor Organization: City-specific public/private partnerships 
 
Target: Building home equity and strengthening the social fabric of communities that are “in the 
middle.” 
 
Approach: The Healthy Neighborhoods Initiative is a model developed initially in Battle Creek, MI 
that has since been adopted in other cities, most publicly in Baltimore. Healthy Neighborhoods targets 
neighborhoods that are “in the middle” or “on the cusp” – neighborhoods that have weak but still 
functioning real estate markets, appear to be stable, but are in fact suffering from disinvestments of 
both money and civic engagement.  The strategy seeks to turn these neighborhoods into healthy 
neighborhoods, meaning places where residents want to and do invest time, money, and energy into 
the neighborhood and their homes. Further, the goal is for residents in these neighborhoods to manage 
neighborhood issues on their own.  The focus is on residents taken control of their neighborhood 
rather than relying on CDCs or other community organizations to take the lead. 
 
The Healthy Neighborhoods approach is a demand-side rather than supply-side housing strategy for 
neighborhood revitalization. Success is not measured by the monetary amount of investment or 
number of housing units built.  Rather, the performance of the housing market, measured by increased 
house prices and increased demand for housing, is the indicator of success in this model.  Residents 
and new buyers showing confidence in the future of the neighborhood is another indicator of success. 
 
This model focuses on emphasizing what is positive about a neighborhood and capitalizing on these 
attributes rather than trying to target and eliminate problems in the neighborhood. Individual 
investments in a neighborhood, such as the decision to buy a home there or to invest time and money 
in keeping up an existing home, are guided by the issues of choice, competition, confidence, and 
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predictability. The argument surrounding choice is that spending on housing is based primarily on 
consumer wants rather than needs. In a healthy neighborhood, more residents choose to make 
investments in their home.  Neighborhoods must also be able to compete with other housing choices, 
with constantly changing competitors, year after year.  Confidence in a neighborhood is expressed by 
the demand for housing in the neighborhood and the willingness of existing owners to invest in their 
homes. Residents also value predictability in their neighborhoods, relying on unspoken agreements 
about expected levels of maintenance and courtesy among neighbors. When neighbors no longer 
interact, these unspoken agreements tend to fall apart. 
 
Key Revitalization Activities and Tools:  The Healthy Neighborhoods model uses a variety of 
techniques to strengthen the fabric of communities.  The key elements of this strategy are: 
 
• Targeting the strongest blocks in a community for the initial stages of the program; 
• Emphasizing the positive assets of a community rather than problems that need solving; 
• Below market rate financing that is available both to current residents for making property 
improvements and to new buyers for rehabilitating their new homes up to the new 
neighborhood property standards; 
• Changing the mindsets of residents and community agency staff to become marketers of their 
community and marketing their new image to realtors and lenders; and 
• Focusing on a variety of small block projects that produce visible neighborhood changes. 
  
Healthy Neighborhoods funding primarily goes to home improvement loans to help homes that need 
minor repairs to look better.  This funding could go to lighting, landscaping, painting, and other 
surface improvements.  There are no income restrictions in this program because restricting assistance 
to low-income groups may indicate to outsiders that a neighborhood is in trouble.  Loans are given to 
those who can pay them back; the program goal is to minimize foreclosure in the neighborhood. 
 
Exact criteria for defining these neighborhoods have never been established, but some general 
indicators for this type of neighborhood are: a decent homeownership rate (around 50 percent), the 
presence of some vacant properties that linger just long enough to discourage investment in the area, 
some drug activity and crime, and a housing market that is neither in demand nor rapidly declining.  
These neighborhoods would not be described as dangerous, but they are beginning to decline.   
 
Leadership Structure: In Baltimore, the Baltimore Community Foundation administers the program 
and gives grants to local agencies. An existing neighborhood groups runs the program locally, but this 
need not be a CDC.  There must be an organizational base in place, which could be a nonprofit or a 
neighborhood association, as well as a strong Executive Director and some evidence that the 
organization is already addressing some revitalization needs in its target neighborhood.  For some 
agencies, the Healthy Neighborhoods strategy is a complementary strategy to what is already being 
done, while for others it becomes the primary strategy.  Nonprofits provide some technical assistance 
for design issues and marketing.  In Baltimore, there are plans to incorporate a nonprofit that will 
continue the initiative in the future. 
 
Partners, Funders, and Resources: In Baltimore, the Healthy Neighborhoods Initiative was funded 
by $3 million from HUD and approximately $10,000,000 from non-federal sources (see exhibit 
below).  Partners include the State of Maryland, Community Legacy, Baltimore City's Department of 
Housing and Community Development, Abell, Goldseker, Fannie Mae, France-Merrick and 
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Baltimore Community Foundations, Community Capital of Maryland, Baltimore Neighborhood 
Collaborative and 12 lending institutions in the Baltimore area. Baltimore also used the Historic 
Preservation Tax Credit program and a grant from HUD in its initiative. 
 
In the pilot, each site received between $25,000 and $50,000 in operating funds and project support of 
up to $25,000 per neighborhood from the Baltimore Community Foundation. 
 
Baltimore Healthy Neighborhoods Initiative – 
Financial Commitments to the Two-Year Pilot Program 
Source Amount Purpose 
Federal Government 
(HUD) 
$3,000,000 Capital pool for purchase and rehab financing at 3 percent 
interest rate 
State Government (MD) $1,000,000 Capital pool for purchase and rehab financing at 3 percent 
interest rate 
National and Local 
Foundations (6) 
$1,200,000 Staff at lead organization, training and operating costs, 
community-self-help projects, staff at local nonprofits 
Private Lenders (14) $115,000  
$6,200,000  
Operating costs 
Below market first mortgage loan pool 
Community Development 
Finance Institutions (1) 
$1,000,000 Construction loan fund 
 
Outcomes and Evaluation Findings:  David Boehlke, who helped create the first Healthy 
Neighborhoods Initiative in Battle Creek, MI, did an evaluation of the Baltimore program, which 
reported the following: 
 
• One neighborhood realized a 10% increase in house price sales and had its first bidding 
war for a house that sold above the asking price. 
• 34 rehab and purchase/rehab loans were issued totaling $1.1 million 
• 59 more loans are in the process of closing, totaling $2.7 million 
• Neighborhoods have created new block captains, many of whom are new to community 
development projects and are participating in other projects 
• In one neighborhood, the average house price of homes sold in 2002 since the initiative 
began is 22% higher than the average sales price in 2000. 
 
In addition to these positive outcomes, Baltimore staff also found some lessons learned from the first 
few years of the initiative: 
 
• Increased property values are not enough to revitalize a neighborhood. Residents must become 
civically engaged in order to make this truly successful.  In Baltimore, staff found that resident 
engagement in block projects is the best way to build momentum for community change.  
Residents will not only participate in some physical revitalization efforts that are highly visible, 
they will also develop a social network with their neighbors. 
 
• Replace negative language with positive symbols.  Homebuyers will not want to move to the 
neighborhood simply because something bad has been removed; rather, they need positive 
signifiers to attract them to the neighborhood. 
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• Marketing and publicity are just as important as the positive changes they promote.  It is essential 
to make successes known to the outside world, not just to partners and funders.  Publicity will 
attract outside funding.  In the Healthy Neighborhood approach, positive marketing also 
contributes to the success of the program by increasing the demand for housing. 
 
• “Building from strength” is a difficult concept to grasp.  Community leaders unfamiliar with the 
Healthy Neighborhoods approach may find it difficult to change their philosophy from one 
focused on fixing problems to one that builds from strength. 
 
• The local agency with funding should also be the program administrator.  Requiring potential 
borrowers to go back and forth between different agencies injects a layer of bureaucracy that 
discourages participation. 
 
• Potential borrowers should be treated like customers.  The initiative is trying to fight 
disinvestment in the neighborhood, so the loan application process should be made as simple as 
possible to encourage use of the system. 
 
• Lead abatement is costly and may discourage some rehabilitation efforts.  A possible remedy is to 
make a loan pool available to homeowners for the costs of lead abatement, including the cost of 
lead testing. 
 
• Block projects are the best way to build momentum for community change.  Residents can get 
hands-on involvement in the revitalization efforts while at the same time building community 
with their neighbors.  This will inspire interest in Healthy Neighborhoods much more than will 
below-market rate financing. 
 
• A dedicated rehab specialist will help spur rehabilitation loan use.  The rehab specialist helps 
residents consider what type of work their house needs and what will be the most impactful 
change for the neighborhood’s appearance.  
 
Neighborhood and Family Initiative (NFI) 
 
Sponsor Organization: Ford Foundation 
 
Target: Comprehensive community development in four urban neighborhoods 
 
Approach: Launched in 1990, NFI was one of the earliest comprehensive community initiatives.  
The goal of the 10-year initiative was to improve the physical, social and economic circumstances of 
the four target neighborhoods by building on and strengthening community strengths (resident 
leadership) and creating and exploiting synergies among different types of community development 
(housing, economic, human capital, etc.). 
 
Two principles underlying the initiative are: 1) comprehensive change (making use of 
interrelationships among the social, economic, and physical needs and opportunities of the 
neighborhood); 2) organizational collaboration and citizen participation (resident involvement, 
public/private collaboration, city/neighborhood collaboration). 
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Ford did not specify outcomes or a theory of change.  Local actors were supposed to identify desired 
outcomes and the strategy for achieving them based on an assessment of local needs and priorities.  
 
The neighborhoods (in Detroit, Memphis, Milwaukee, and Hartford) were chosen based on four 
criteria: 
• Clear need for intervention 
• Neighborhoods had assets on which to build 
• Relatively few initiatives already in place 
• Availability of a community foundation to act as a local intermediary. 
 
The four neighborhoods chosen are all urban, with 9,000-20,000 residents; have poverty rates ranging 
from 29% to 52%; and are primarily residential.  Despite these commonalities, the neighborhoods 
each had a different character and different challenges.  For example, the Detroit neighborhood was 
large, poor, and filled with a population that was largely single, male, and transient.  The 
neighborhood was dominated by large institutions (including an art institute, the symphony, and two 
large medical centers) that had little interaction with neighborhood residents.  In contrast, the 
Memphis neighborhood was small and was dominated by small churches and some primary and 
secondary schools.  As compared to Detroit, the neighborhood had a much higher homeownership 
rate, more residential stability, and more resident connection to the neighborhood. 
 
Key Revitalization Activities and Tools:  The kinds of programs differed significantly from site to 
site, and in most cases were quite small – discrete, time-limited projects, the impact of which was 
limited to those individuals directly involved.  Programs included: 
 
• Increased access to existing services and some new supportive services; 
• Connections to jobs in the city and economic development activities; 
• Physical revitalization, e.g., housing repair, beautification, renovation to commercial 
facilities;  
• Leveraging of resources for neighborhood improvement. 
 
Leadership Structure:  Each site had a community foundation that served as a local intermediary and 
was the direct grantee.  The community foundations selected the target neighborhoods, hired staff 
directors, created a neighborhood collaborative to act as local governing structure, and managed the 
Ford funding. 
 
The neighborhood collaboratives included residents, business owners and professionals, and 
professionals from the city’s private, private, and nonprofit sectors.  The collaboratives were charged 
with identifying neighborhood needs, developing strategies to address those needs, and overseeing 
implementation activities. 
 
Partners, Funders, and Resources:  Ford provided approximately $3 million for operations and 
program support in each of the four sites, plus dedicated support for TA and evaluations.  Grant 
period varied from 9 months to 3 years.  Ford established a program-related investment fund of $3 
million managed by a national intermediary for the local initiatives to draw on for development 
projects. 
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The funding allocation was not consistent throughout the demonstration, however, which proved 
problematic.  For three years there was a $1 million yearly grant, followed by a series of 18-month 
$500,000 grants.  Evaluators found that shortening the grant period made grantees question Ford’s 
commitment to the initiative.  
 
Outcomes and Evaluation Findings:  The series of evaluation reports by the Chapin Hall Center for 
Children at the University of Chicago are very informative, and quite critical of the initiative 
(Chaskin et al, 2000).  Some of the key findings are summarized here: 
 
• The “comprehensive” vision proved very difficult to implement.  The concept was too 
broad to be effectively implemented, and as a result the collaboratives were unable to 
organize activities in the synergistic ways that the demonstration anticipated and much of 
the program activities turned out to be relatively traditional, narrow in scope, and targeted 
to a particular set of outcomes without clear relationship to neighborhood change. 
 
• The initial funding was not sufficient to effect comprehensive change.  In addition, 
uncertainty around funding discouraged long-term planning, and the funding that could 
be leveraged from other sources tended to be for discrete projects, not “comprehensive” 
initiatives.  Sites were not well prepared for the end of the demonstration and had little 
training in how to continue to leverage funding after the main funder was no longer 
involved.  Ford should have set a clear exit strategy. 
 
• The collaborative structure did not survive beyond the demonstration.  The collaborative 
relationships among organizations focused on information sharing and complementing 
each other’s activities, and were most successful when organized around specific 
projects.  But collaboration had costs – in terms of the time and commitment required – 
and there needed to be incentives to collaboration.  A broad mandate to collaborate was 
not effective. 
 
• The leadership structure was not successful across all sites because of the ambiguity of 
Ford’s role and because of insider/outsider tensions between the community foundations 
and the collaboratives.  Where they existed, effective partnerships between community 
foundations and collaborations took a long time to develop.  Ultimately, the 
collaboratives chose to incorporate themselves as independent nonprofits to gain 
autonomy from the community foundations; the community foundations also wanted to 
eliminate the collaborative structure so as to have a more traditional funder/grantee 
relationship. 
 
• Neighborhood change resulting from NFI was at a very small scale.  The impact of most 
NFI-funded projects was limited, with the exception of some of the more capital-
intensive programs (housing development, career-path employment, physical 
redevelopment).  The most obvious changes in the neighborhood have been due to much 
larger infusions of capital by private developers and public-sector initiatives such as 
EZ/EC.  NFI projects tended to support these other efforts rather than generate 
neighborhood change themselves. 
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• Sites were reluctant to conduct local evaluations.   Dedicated funding was not initially set 
aside for local evaluations, so sites viewed evaluations as taking away from program 
activity.  Local evaluators also felt at odds with the national evaluator as the two tiers 
appeared to have contradictory goals.  
 
• There needs to be good, grounded knowledge of the neighborhood from the outset.  Do 
not create a one-size-fits all revitalization model.  Each neighborhood is different, with its 
own strengths, weaknesses, and needs.  The goals and outcome measures for the initiative 
must also take this into account. 
 
• Be aware of the complexities in working with different stakeholders. Residents may not 
have the vocabulary or training necessary to relate to community planners or consultants.  
Disparate interests and opinions may create tension in a planning board consisting of 
residents, community builders, and those with resources (banks, local government, 
institutions).  Actual or perceived power imbalances can disrupt the goal of building 
partnerships.   
 
Rebuilding Communities Initiative 
Sponsor Organization: Annie E. Casey Foundation 
 
Target: Strengthening families and communities in distressed neighborhoods. 
 
Approach: The Rebuilding Communities Initiative (RCI) was launched in 1993 as an effort to build 
the capacity of distressed neighborhoods to change their communities into safe and supportive places. 
RCI, funded through the Annie E. Casey Foundation, funded lead neighborhood agencies in five 
cities across the country. The initiative had goals of improving housing and infrastructure, increasing 
capital investments in the neighborhood, using neighborhood institutions to improve their capacity, 
developing collaboratives of local agencies who could eventually take over the project, using existing 
capital to maximize impact on the neighborhood, and increasing residents’ power. 
 
Leadership Structure: CBOs led the initiative in the five neighborhoods, though the collaborative 
nature of the leadership differed slightly by site.  Some sites chose to incorporate separate 
organizations that would lead RCI, while others created subsets of their own organization.  CBOs 
were chosen based on proven success, their standing in the community, and their ability to lead a 
community-driven effort.  
 
Key Revitalization Activities and Tools: The initiative was divided into three phases: planning, 
capacity building, and implementation.  In the first phase, the lead agency in each neighborhood 
collaborated with residents to develop a comprehensive plan. In the second phase, the sites looked for 
other sources of capital, developed their abilities, refined their plans, and created partnerships. In the 
third phase, the sites used the skills they have learned to address one or more issues in the 
neighborhood. 
 
Partners, Funders, and Resources: The Annie E. Casey Foundation is the main sponsor of this 
initiative. The total funding for this project from AECF was over $15 million over the course of 7 
years, totaling over $3 million per neighborhood.  Lead agencies were selected in each of the 5 
 
 
 Review of Neighborhood Revitalization Initiatives 30 
communities. These agencies formed partnerships with other agencies in the area, as well as with 
local governments, residents, and community groups. 
 
Outcomes and Evaluation Findings: AECF measured some positive outcomes from the initiative: 
• Lead agencies improved their staff, management systems, and resources. 
• All partners improved their ability to use data and evaluation techniques. 
• Communities strengthened their images, thereby increasing their ability to attract outside 
investors. 
• Lead agencies increased their collaboration with other agencies. 
 
There were also lessons learned about the process of forming and implementing a comprehensive 
community initiative: 
• CCIs suffer from high expectations and meager resources.   
• Collaborations can be difficult when local agencies with long histories are forced to 
interact.  The lead agency may face resentment from smaller partners and residents 
because of the perceived inevitability of the larger agency’s agenda. Successful CBOs 
may not feel comfortable functioning as an equal participant in a collaboration. 
• Resident-led governance boards were politically contentious.  Long-standing community 
leaders refused to participate in the initiative when they were not given total authority. 
• It took a long time for the local sites to trust the TA providers.  Initially, TA providers 
met only with Casey for guidance.  It was ultimately decided that TA providers would 
work for the RCI – not for Casey and not for the local sites – which meant TA providers 
were accountable to both groups.  This approach of a co-planning TA provider can also 
help reduce the funder-grantee power imbalance. 
 
Despite the successes of the Rebuilding Communities Initiative, agencies and residents struggled a 
great deal with the goals and plans set by AECF.  The challenges they faced helped AECF build 
better partnerships with agencies in future initiatives (see Making Connections).  
 
Making Connections 
Sponsor Organization: Annie E. Casey Foundation 
 
Target: Strengthening families in “tough” neighborhoods. 
 
Approach:  The Annie E. Casey Foundation launched Making Connections in 1999.  The program 
will span 10 years in 22 cities in an effort to improve the lives of families and children in “tough” 
neighborhoods. Tough neighborhoods are distressed or disadvantaged neighborhoods, although 
branding them as “tough” connotes the resiliency of the residents who live in them. The AECF 
believes the guiding principle that “children do better when their families are strong and families do 
better when they live in places that help them succeed as parents and productive citizens.” The key 
goals of the initiative are: 
• To create the opportunity to earn a living wage and promote asset-building; 
• Strengthening connections among families, neighbors, religious organizations, and civic 
groups; and 
• Increasing the availability of reliable social services within the neighborhoods. 
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Key Revitalization Activities and Tools:  AECF provides technical assistance to local agencies and 
community groups, building on local expertise whenever possible. AECF also works to build local 
partners (local learning partnerships or LLPs) at each site who can put together data on the 
neighborhood and work with residents to analyze the data to determine where the greatest 
neighborhoods needs and greatest assets are.  LLPs are a consortia of researchers, consultants, 
community residents, and government representatives created with the intent of developing data 
warehouses that can be made accessible to the sites to establish a baseline and track progress.  The 
LLPs help facilitate a learning agenda for self-evaluation. The Foundation also encourages 
networking and communication among the sites and has an extensive media center to disperse 
information about the initiative. 
 
Sites were chosen based on the following criteria: 
• A policy environment that was conducive to the AECF mission; 
• The presence of some family-oriented revitalization already underway; and 
• A track record of achievement in family-centric revitalization. 
 
Of the twenty-two sites initially chosen to participate, ten are currently fully active Making 
Connections sites. Within that ten, there are two cohorts: five sites that were better prepared at the 
start of the initiative and are currently in the implementation phase and five sites that are still in the 
planning phase.  AECF chose the target neighborhoods within each city with input from the sites. The 
hopes is that success through Making Connections in target neighborhoods will be an entry point for 
larger scale intervention in the city. 
 
Sites are expected to define revitalization plans that are the most useful to their local community 
needs.  Each site may focus on one area at any given time, but all sites must work toward focusing on 
the three target areas of economic development, social networks, and supportive services.  
 
Leadership Structure:  The leadership structure is purposefully undefined by AECF.  Casey wanted 
the communities to define the leadership structure and to provide broad support for revitalization 
initiatives rather than defining a specific organizational structure. Local agencies and community 
groups generally lead the initiative locally, with significant partnering, although assembling the local 
partners generally has taken 2-3 years. 
 
Each Making Connections site has a site team leader who is an AECF staff person.  The team leader 
forms relationships with residents of the community and communicates the intent of the program.  
Additional AECF staff support the site team leader but the number varies by site.  After an 
unspecified amount of time, Casey site teams transfer the leadership to a local coordinator so that 
there is community ownership of the project. 
 
Partners, Funders, and Resources: The Annie E. Casey Foundation is the primary sponsor of this 
program, although their funding acts primarily as seed money with other agencies providing 
additional assistance.  All ten active sites receive a core amount of funding from AECF, but the use of 
that funding varies greatly across sites.  This funding will be disbursed over time as projects develop; 
there is no set disbursement schedule.  
 
AECF works with different agencies in different ways, depending on local needs. Local partners 
include government officials, faith communities and faith leaders, schools, community organizations 
and leaders, and local residents. In this and other efforts, Casey partners with agencies such as United 
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Way of America, Points of Light Foundation, Goodwill Industries, the National Governors 
Association, Conference of Mayors, and the National Conference of State Legislatures. 
 
Outcomes and Evaluation Findings:  This initiative is still in progress, but AECF has set goals for 
achieving the following outcomes by the end of the initiative:  
• Families will have increased assets, earnings, and income; 
• Civic participation will increase; 
• Children will be healthy and well-prepared for school; and 
• Communities and families will have strong ties and support networks among them. 
 
In addition to the goals AECF has set for the initiative, some early results have been promising. More 
than half of the MC sites worked together in 2002 to expand access and awareness of the Earned 
Income Tax Credit in their communities. The MC sites worked with free tax preparation sites in an 
effort to increase EITC usage and reduce the reliance on paid tax preparers. Ultimately, the residents 
got $51 million in tax preparation fee savings and EITC refunds. 
 
In Denver, residents formed a new parent-led organization to address issues of concern about their 
children’s education, including safety, attendance, and academics. This new group is helping to 
bridge the gap between low-income parents and their children’s schools. The Denver MC site has also 
held numerous meetings to work on a town-wide consensus for how to go about strengthening 
families. 
 
In Des Moines, the MC team has worked to eliminate predatory lending in the area. The team formed 
partnerships with local banks and Fannie Mae to create a program to buy back high-interest loans in 
an effort to reduce interest rates for families paying too much. The team has also been successful in 
raising awareness of this problem and getting state and city laws enacted to combat predatory lending. 
 
The Hartford MC team has a program to help disadvantaged youths get and keep quality jobs. The 
programs works with well-established businesses to create mentoring relationships with youths 
referred through social service agencies, many of who have had run-ins with the juvenile justice 
system. Ninety-six percent of program graduates are still in their jobs or in school. 
 
In Indianapolis, the mayor has recently been granted the power to create five new charter schools per 
year.  The application process to become a charter school includes an emphasis on transportation 
barriers for families in tough neighborhoods and how to solve these barriers. The MC team has also 
worked on creating a community school in a formerly abandoned high school that now offers adult 
education, recreation, and social services to the neighborhood.  
 
The Louisville MC team has created an asset-building coalition in partnership with local banks, 
churches, CBOs, hospitals, and other groups. The Coalition is involved in the promotion of the EITC 
to neighborhood residents. The increased outreach and free tax preparation sites could bring as much 
as $2 million in EITC refunds back into the community.  The team has also started an IDA program 
that matches saved money 2 to 1. The program now has 140 participants with 200 people on the 
waiting list. 
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Neighborhood Preservation Initiative 
Sponsor Organization: Pew Charitable Trusts 
 
Target: Revitalization of working-class neighborhoods 
 
Approach: NPI was a partnership between the Pew Charitable Trusts, local foundations, local 
community organizations, and residents of working class neighborhoods in nine cities. Established in 
1993, the three-year NPI demonstration had primary goals of assisting residents of working class 
neighborhoods to visibly improve their neighborhoods while learning how to sustain this type of 
neighborhood preservation themselves in the future.  The premise behind this initiative is that 
philanthropists and government subsidies often overlook working class neighborhoods because they 
are not the most distressed areas.  These neighborhoods often still need revitalization.  NPI sought to 
prevent neighborhoods from succumbing to neighborhood decline by strengthening assets already in 
the community. By making small investments to prevent decline, NPI efforts ultimately prevented 
expenditures of the larger sums necessary to repair blighted neighborhoods. Visible neighborhood 
improvement is achieved when several types of revitalization efforts are put into place at once.  
Residents were encouraged to plan and set priorities for local initiatives with the belief that resident 
involvement will help sustain the new improvements after the initiative ended. 
 
NPI began with four goals: 
1. Be a catalyst for revitalization in these neighborhoods; 
2. Create visibility for the revitalization effort such that additional funding is leveraged; 
3. Build capacity to continue this work; and 
4. Send the neighborhood in a positive direction. 
 
The sites were selected from urban areas with a population of over 1 million.  These locations also 
needed to have community foundations that with annual grant activity of $2.5 million or more.  The 
neighborhoods selected by NPI were originally described as “working-class” but the neighborhoods 
themselves preferred the term “transitional.”  This new terminology reflected the fact that the 
neighborhood was experiencing significant change (usually negative) that deserved to be addressed.  
The following types of change are considered indicators of a transitional neighborhood: 
 
• Significant recent changes in demographics (age, race, ethnicity); 
• Recent population gain or loss in conjunction with increasing diversity; 
• Loss of jobs or local companies; relocation of churches and community institutions to the 
suburbs; 
• Reduced participation in civic organizations; 
• A trend toward rental rather than homeownership units, with an increasing number of 
absentee landlords; 
• Increasing numbers of vacant or blighted residential or commercial buildings; and 
• Changes in the local school system that negatively impacted the community-school 
relationship. 
• Working-class neighborhoods tend to have homeownership rates, household incomes, and 
employment rates at or near the citywide average. 
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Key Revitalization Activities and Tools: NPI grantees ran programs in one or more of four focus 
areas: crime prevention, economic opportunity, physical revitalization, and youth development. Sites 
designed programs that best met local needs based on the preferences and priorities of residents. NPI 
provided technical assistance through conferences and sites were encouraged to learn from each 
other.  The NPI philosophy is that the energy and commitment of community groups is more 
important than targeting specific activities.  Regardless of what revitalization tools are used, energy 
and momentum from committed community groups will produce the greatest “bang for your buck” 
every time.  The initiative can start small and build off of early successes if the community groups 
offer their full support. 
 
In Kansas City, KS, the following specific tools were used:  
• Facilitating the continued success of positive trends by establishing multi-year planning 
strategies. 
• Inspiring homeowners to improve and maintain the appearance of their neighborhood. 
• Working with the local lending and appraisal community to ensure that private lending is 
readily available and appraisals are fair. 
• Improving public perceptions of the safety of the town, not just focusing on negative 
crime indicators.  
 
Leadership Structure:  NPI formed partnerships with 9 local foundations to administer its funding at 
the local level.  These foundations selected 10 strong community based organizations (2 in St. Paul, 1 
in every other city) and the local organizations led the initiative.  Five were community or economic 
development corporations and five were community or resident groups.  Agencies were chosen based 
on capacity, track record, and long-time operations.  In the case of organizations that had only done 
housing in the past, NPI required the agencies to establish that they had the interest, commitment, and 
ability to address the non-housing aspects of the initiative.  The organization’s true relationship with 
the neighborhood was also considered.  Site visits to the organizations helped establish whether the 
interaction with the neighborhood was cursory or truly deep. Foundations were responsible for 
obtaining the 50% local match. 
  
Partners, Funders, and Resources: This program was initially funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts, 
with each participating foundation responsible for obtaining 50% in match funds. The Pew Charitable 
Trusts gave three-year project grants to nine foundations in 1994, totaling $6.6 million. Communities 
could each receive up to $800,000 over three years with the condition of a 50% local match. The total 
investment across all sites was $8.5 million ($6.6 million in grants), with combined national and local 
funding yielding a $1 million annual budget per site per year for three years.   
 
The following foundations acted as local partners: The Boston Foundation, The Cleveland 
Foundation, The Indianapolis Foundation, Greater Kansas City Community Foundation, Community 
Foundation of Greater Memphis, The Milwaukee Foundation, The Philadelphia Foundation, The St. 
Paul Foundation, The San Francisco Foundation.  Among the lead agencies in the initiative, five are 
neighborhood associations or community resources centers and five are community or economic 
development corporations.   
 
Outcomes and Evaluation Findings: The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government did an 
evaluation and the Cornerstone Consulting Group (the initiative management firm after the original 
project director left) produced two evaluative reports with lessons learned. Several years after the 
 
 
 Review of Neighborhood Revitalization Initiatives 35 
initiative’s completion, all of the local agencies and their NPI-started programs are still in operation.  
Organizations were generally not able to completely replace the national funding after the 
demonstration ended, but they have diversified their funding sources in order to meet the additional 
need.   
 
The outcome measures for NPI were not as rigorous as some national initiatives.  The Program 
Director believed that positive change should be measured by what “you can see with your own 
eyes.”  The evaluation reported positive changes (without quantifying them) in the following areas:  
expanded employment opportunities, increased access to public transportation, economic 
redevelopment of commercial districts, improved housing stock, rehabilitation of blighted units, and 
maintenance of the owner-renter distribution.  
 
More specifically, in Kansas the initiative helped produce lower crime rates, increased mortgage 
lending resources, increased property values, and established higher standards of property 
maintenance. Average housing sales prices increased 28% over the 1995-1999 period; the 
neighborhood association more than quadrupled its membership; volunteers repaired 415 homes; and 
numerous blighted and vacant buildings were demolished or rehabilitated. 
 
Although specific outcome measures were not specified by NPI, the program did require local sites to 
submit a strategic plan.  NPI conducted site visits and follow-up to ensure that sites were following 
their strategic plan and provided assistance when needed to overcome barriers.  It is important to note, 
however, that after the demonstration phase was over, sites found it difficult to obtain additional 
funding without concrete outcomes measures. 
 
Additionally, some process lessons were learned about CCIs: 
• A comprehensive framework is the most powerful way to achieve neighborhood 
revitalization.  When different groups work on different aspects of the project, in the end they 
all fit together to create comprehensive change. 
• It is important to work with established organizations if you have limited resources. Do not 
try to build a new organization.  Real estate projects involve concrete activities that result in 
visible capital investments, while non-real estate projects function on a continuous basis and 
outcomes are not immediately visible or concrete.  These two types of projects require 
different management styles.  NPI considered organizations that had only done housing in the 
past, but required these organizations to establish that they had interest, commitment, and the 
ability to address the non-housing aspects of the initiative. 
• There will always be tensions between the funder and the grantee. The funder should try to 
minimize these tensions by making intentions clear from the outset and giving local sites 
sufficient autonomy. 
• Racial politics should be addressed by the initiative.  Race is an overlooked and unattended 
issue in community development. There is no perfect tool for addressing racial issues, but the 
initiative cannot ignore this factor of daily life in the communities. 
• Neighborhoods will never be freed from the need to revitalize.  Maintaining the positive 
changes in a revitalized neighborhood requires constant vigilance. Outside forces will 
continue to threaten neighborhood stability. 
• “Sustainability” has a different definition for residents and foundations.  While funders may 
define sustainability as secured additional funding and continued program functions, residents 
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tend to define it as a feeling and spirit in the neighborhood that positive change and civic 
engagement will continue.  The resident definition may be impossible to measure.   
• Neighborhood-level outcome measurements are not always appropriate.  In areas such as 
workforce development or economic development, citywide or several neighborhood-wide 
measurements may be more telling. 
 
The Pew Partnership Small Cities Initiative 
Sponsor Organization: The Pew Charitable Trusts/The Pew Partnership 
 
Target: Evaluating how community residents make lasting community changes, using small cities as 
the learning tool.  
 
Approach: The Pew Partnership, which was formed by the Pew Charitable Trusts, solicited 
applications from more than 100 cities across the county to participate in the small cities initiative in 
1992. Fourteen communities were selected in 1993 to participate in the three-year program. This 
initiative sought to determine how community residents make significant and permanent changes to 
their communities. Smaller cities were chosen for this initiative because it was thought that the ways 
in which residents make choices and effect change would be easier to witness in a smaller 
community.  The lessons learned in these small cities could then be applied to cities of all sizes.  Each 
city chose a project to use as a means to learn about the civic change process in addition to achieving 
the project’s immediate goals (such as mentoring at-risk youth). 
 
Key Revitalization Activities and Tools: Local programs covered a wide range of social service and 
community revitalization goals. Programs included enrichment and mentoring programs for at-risk 
youth, Family Resource Centers, workforce development, diversity training, affordable housing 
preservation, and economic development. One program in Western North Carolina spanned 22 
counties of small, rural communities and used the local handmade crafts tradition to spur community 
development and revitalization. 
 
Partners, Funders, and Resources: The Pew Charitable Trusts (via the Pew Partnership) funded this 
project. The Pew Partnership granted $6 million (in grants and technical assistance) to 14 
communities in 1993.  Each city was given up to $400,000 over a three-year period. Eight of these 
cities received an additional $50,000 in funding from Pew for an additional one-year of operations. 
The partner groups were required to provide at least a 25% local match.  Ultimately, more than $27 
million in public and private investment was leveraged because of the initial Pew investment. 
 
Outcomes and Evaluation Findings: This initiative had both an experimental component, namely 
determining how communities effect civic change, as well as a concrete component – the individual 
projects in the study cities.  Outcomes include: 
 
• A broad-based partnership in Santa Fe helped 369 low-income residents move into 
homeownership through the development of new housing units. 
• The Family Resource Center in West Virginia has been so successful in Charleston that the 
model is being used in other cities across the state. 
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• In rural Western North Carolina, an additional $4.4 million in new investments were made in 
the area between 1996 and 1998. In addition, 24 new businesses were started and businesses 
included in a guidebook funded by the initiative experienced sales increases of 20%. 
• Mentoring and peer counseling of Native American youth in Rapid City, SD helped 
dramatically reduce the number of fights involving these students in local middle schools. 
• Five hundred summer jobs were created in Lane County, OR through its mentoring and 
networking program for youth. 
 
Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization Program 
Sponsor Organization: Minneapolis City Council 
 
Target: City-wide revitalization with a focus on housing 
 
Approach: The NRP was established by the Minnesota State Legislature and the Minneapolis City 
Council in 1990. Twenty million dollars per year for twenty years was allocated to this project, to be 
taken from city tax revenues. Housing programs must make up 52.5% of NRP’s expenditures. 
Neighborhoods within the city must develop Neighborhood Action Plans that address a variety of 
issues, including housing, transportation, job creation, and community spaces.  
 
Neighborhoods applying for NRP funding must follow a six-step process:  
 
1. Elect a steering committee with a plan for structured meetings and events. 
2. Identify needs and opportunities in the neighborhood through local data. 
3. Create a plan for the proposed initiatives. 
4. Allow for public comment of the plan, incorporating resident suggestions. 
5. Submit neighborhood plan to overseeing NRP agency for approval and funding. 
6. Once the plan is approved, volunteers can begin the implementation process. 
 
Minneapolis NRP differs from most community initiatives because it truly gives citizens the power to 
make change in their neighborhoods.  This is both its key strength and its key obstacle. The project 
continuously struggles between letting citizens have full autonomy in the process versus setting 
guidelines for the project at a city level.  
 
Key Revitalization Activities and Tools: Neighborhoods participating in NRP have a variety of 
tools available to them. These tools include additional financing sources (Housing Trust Fund, 
Single-family mortgage revenue bond program), existing laws (Tax Increment Finance Districts, 
Locational policies and design guidelines, Inclusionary Zoning), and an online database of previously 
approved neighborhood plans and projects. 
 
NRP neighborhoods are classified into one of three descriptive categories.  Board members are 
appointed based on representations from the following groups: 
 
• Protection neighborhoods are neighborhoods that are experiencing few social, physical, 
and economic problems, but have concerns about the delivery of public services; 
 
 
 
 Review of Neighborhood Revitalization Initiatives 38 
• Revitalization neighborhoods are neighborhoods that are fundamentally sound but are 
beginning to experience some social, physical, and economic problems;  
 
• Redirection neighborhoods are neighborhoods experiencing serious social, physical, and 
economic problems. 
 
Leadership Structure: The NRP is governed by a policy board made up of members from the five 
branches of city government (city, schools, library, county, and parks/recreation), community group 
members (Chamber of Commerce), nonprofit and foundation representatives (United Way and 
Minneapolis Foundation), and private citizens.  NRP staff called Neighborhood Specialists and Team 
Leaders oversee the planning process at the neighborhood level by attending neighborhood steering 
committee meetings. NRP staff members ensure that the planning process goes smoothly and follows 
the correct procedures, but residents make the plan decisions. 
 
The resident leadership structure has changed significantly over time.  At the start of NRP, traditional 
activists who were already leaders in local community groups led the resident involvement efforts. 
After more than ten years of NRP, there is now a new crop of community leaders.  The new leaders 
have seen the power of NRP and, according to NRP’s director, are more creative, are more aware of 
the bigger picture, and are much less likely to have projects dictated to them by other community 
actors.  
 
The projects neighborhoods are pursuing have also changed over time.  The first projects tackled 
were the most obvious issues that needed addressing that required relatively little cooperation across 
neighborhoods.  These included renovation of local parks, community centers, and schools as well as 
traffic abatement and home improvement loans.  As some of these problems have been solved, 
neighborhoods have begun to address larger issues – such as the revitalization of a commercial 
corridor spanning 14 neighborhoods – that require cooperation, collaboration, and more funding 
sources.  Neighborhoods have increased their cooperation over time – there are well over 200 
agreements in place between neighborhoods. 
 
Partners, Funders, and Resources: The City Council established the NRP in 1990 and committed 
$20 million per year for 20 years for a total of $400 million. Refinancing tax increment districts 
within the downtown area created the funding source for the entire initiative.  However, state tax 
legislation passed in 2001 rearranged the way property tax rates are calculated, which greatly reduced 
expected revenues for NRP.  The amount of funding was somewhat variable in the two years 
following this change, but in the summer of 2003 $58 million was allocated for years 2003-2009.  
This reduces average funding to $8.3 million per year in Phase II of the initiative. However, NRP 
funding was never intended to fund the entire redevelopment needed in Minneapolis.  Total physical 
revitalization costs are estimated at $3 billion and NRP funding was intended to be start-up money for 
this process.  
 
Individual neighborhoods can use NRP funding to leverage other local funding sources and 
community resources.  Most leveraged funding or service-in-kind has come from other city 
government departments with very few resources coming from foundations or the private sector. 
 
Funding for each neighborhood is based on an allocation formula that results in more distressed 
neighborhoods receiving more funding. The formula is based on the following five factors: 
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• Neighborhood population; 
• Number of dwelling units; 
• Number of units administered by absentee landlords; 
• Number of substandard units; and 
• Index of low-economic status based on average income, economic assistance cases, and 
health statistics. 
 
Neighborhood housing and poverty variables made up 48% of this formula in Phase II but will make 
up 87% of the formula in Phase II.  Distressed neighborhoods should get more funding based on this 
change. 
 
Outcomes and Evaluation Findings:  Neighborhoods are responsible for assessing the impact of 
their work and determining whether goals have been met.  However, NRP has also funded a very 
thorough independent evaluation covering the first 10 years of the program.  The evaluation attempts 
to quantify neighborhood impact and impact on beneficiaries as well as document program outcomes.  
Following are selected findings (for the period 1990-1999): 
 
Survey results (survey of 1,100 residents): 
• 66% of adults surveyed had heard of the program; 
• 90% of adults surveyed support the program. 
 
Housing outputs: 
• 46% of NRP allocations were for housing and housing-related activities (short of the 
mandated 52.5%); 
• 4,775 home improvement grants and loans, mainly to homeowners for housing rehab; 
• 675 rental units built or renovated (small amount of NRP funding); 
• 80% of households assisted were homeowners; 
• Revitalization neighborhoods provided the most home improvement assistance and 
homebuyer assistance; redirection neighborhoods did more rental development; protection 
neighborhoods did little more than home improvement lending. 
 
Allocation of funds between housing and economic development and by neighborhood type: 
• Economic development constituted 15% of all NRP allocations, and schools, parks, arts, and 
culture ranged from 6% to 7%; 
• Redirection neighborhoods spent the highest share of their funds on economic development 
and human services and 2nd highest share on housing; revitalization neighborhoods spent the 
highest share on housing, followed by economic development; protection neighborhoods 
spent the least on housing and economic development of the three neighborhood types and 
spent the most on parks, community building, and plan coordination. 
 
Targeting of funds by neighborhood type: 
• Neighborhoods with the highest needs (redirection neighborhoods) received the most 
funding, as did larger neighborhoods.  The poorest neighborhoods received 2.5 times the 
funding as the highest income neighborhoods, and revitalization neighborhoods received 1.5 
times the funding of protection neighborhoods; 
• The average neighborhood allocation was $1,068/household.  Spending was $225 higher per 
household in the more impoverished neighborhoods vs. the higher income neighborhoods.  
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For neighborhoods with higher and lower percentages of people of color, the difference in 
allocation was $449 per household.   
 
Process findings: 
• Foundations and CDCs have their own agendas, which are not necessarily in line with the 
community’s agenda. Foundations also tend to fund only discrete projects through NRP.  
• Make data available to sites from the beginning. PlanNet NRP, a database of project plans, 
demographics, and neighborhood-level data, is a valuable tool that could have been useful to 
sites throughout the initiative. 
• The resident-led model of NRP makes neighborhoods accountable for their success in 
revitalization.  Residents define the problem, plan a solution, implement the plan, and are 
responsible for the impact. This level of ownership is a significant motivator. 
• A politically independent governance structure is the key to success. Because the NRP Policy 
Board is made up of representatives from across city government and residents, no one 
political agenda can take over.  
• There must be a training program for resident volunteers.  Residents need guidance in how to 
plan and implement a community revitalization initiative.  Guidance is needed to help 
residents determine what is feasible. The process of planning and training volunteers could 
take several years.  
• Residents need a guiding force to help them continue the process.  Although NRP is 
scheduled to be a twenty-year program, its Executive Director expects it will be around in 
some form for the rest of the century.  Residents need a lead organization to act as a catalyst 
and to help find resources to continue the revitalization effort. 
 
Asset-Based Community Development 
The Asset-Based Community Development (ABCD) approach to community revitalization focuses 
on identifying and then capitalizing on local assets (rather than identifying and focusing on problems 
and deficiencies). This approach focuses on the skills of citizens, the dedication of community 
organizations, and the resources of formal institutions in the community.  The goal is to bring these 
assets together and strengthen them to help revitalize the neighborhood. This approach is relationship 
driven, such that leaders must constantly strive to build and reinforce the connections between 
residents, associations, and institutions. Underlying this philosophy is the idea that federal and state 
government approaches to assist distressed neighborhoods have created a paternal, needy society that 
looks to the government and social service agencies for support rather than solving problems its own 
problems. 
 
This approach is championed by the Asset-Based Community Development Institute at Northwestern 
University’s Institute for Policy Research. The Institute is funded by the Chicago Community Trust in 
conjunction with the Kinship Foundation. The ABCD Institute also sells its workbooks and tools to 
community developers. 
 
There are a number of applications of asset-based approach.  For example, the Initiative for a 
Competitive Inner City (ICIC) promotes at the competitive advantage of inner city locations as a 
business location.  The idea is that there are hidden financial assets in communities that don’t show 
up as the traditional assets that businesses look at, but these locating in these communities can be very 
advantageous for businesses.   The EZ/EC evaluation found that the city of Detroit did a good job of 
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convincing businesses that they should locate in EZ because they could get better space and buildings 
at a tremendous discount. 
 
Asset-based development is also used in the context of land assembly strategies and strategies for the 
redevelopment of existing structures.  “Asset mapping” is also a fairly common tool used to help 
communities identify their assets. 
 
Smart Growth America 
The concept behind smart growth is that current growth patterns in metropolitan areas are weakening 
urban economies and environmental conditions and increasing racial and economic disparities.  
Further, these patterns are caused by government policies that result in a shift of population and jobs 
from cities to suburbs, and from older suburbs to newer exurbs (adapted from Katz, 2002).   
 
The smart growth agenda revolves around changing the state “rules of the development game” to 
slow decentralization, promote urban reinvestment and promote development that is mixed use, 
transit-oriented, and pedestrian friendly.  Smart growth prioritizes the use of existing infrastructure 
and attempts to limit the sprawl of new infrastructure and concurrent public services into undeveloped 
areas.  In addition, smart growth policies define core areas to make them self-sufficient—including 
housing, work, transportation, shopping, and recreation. 
 
Smart Growth America (SGA) is a coalition of more than 100 national, state, and local advocacy 
organizations that support the smart growth concept.  SGA works in four core areas: collation 
building, communications, policy development, and research.  Tools and concepts promoted by SGA 
include: 
 
• Encouraging mixed land uses  
• Building on existing community assets 
• Creating a range of housing opportunities and choices 
• Fostering walkable, “close knit” communities 
• Promoting distinctive communities with a strong sense of place, including the rehabilitation and 
use of historic buildings 
• Strengthening and encouraging growth in existing communities 
• Providing a variety of transportation options 
• Citizen and stakeholder participation in development decisions  
 
States have been the focus for creating a smart growth framework of law, program, and policy.  State 
smart growth agendas generally consists of five sets of complementary policies: 
 
• New forms of metropolitan (regional) governance; 
• Land use reforms to manage growth at the metropolitan fringe; 
• Initiatives to conserve land threatened by development and clean up land in older communities; 
• Spending and tax incentives for infrastructure improvements in older communities; 
• Tax sharing/metropolitan resource pooling; 
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Many cities are also enacting housing plans that respond to smart growth concerns:  connecting 
housing to transportation, limiting sprawl by encouraging in-fill development and higher density use 
in core areas, addressing the jobs-housing connection, encouraging mixed-use and mixed-income 
development. 
 
Maryland has been at the forefront of the smart growth movement, but little is known about the 
effectiveness of the state’s smart growth program.  There was no evaluation as of August 2002, but 
some evaluation indicators have since been proposed so we can expect an evaluation at some point. 
 
Category B Pilot Program   
Sponsor Organization: Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation 
 
The Category B Pilot Program was a national demonstration of “strategies that revitalize communities 
through homeownership.”  Congress provided funding to Neighborhood Reinvestment for the two-
year pilot as part of a broader effort to increase homeownership opportunities for low-income 
households.  Within this broad goal, Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation developed three 
funding categories—Categories A, B, and C—with specific objectives designed to accommodate 
different levels of capacity among organizations in the NeighborWorks® network supported by the 
Corporation.  A total of $25 million was authorized for the broader demonstration in fiscal years 1999 
and 2000.  Category B sites received grants of $500,000, at least two-thirds of which was to be used 
for lending capital, with the balance available for operating expenses and to pay for a local researcher. 
 
The nine network organizations selected for the Category B Pilot were organizations with proven 
capacity in producing homeownership units, assisting at least 70 new homeowners each year.  
Although some of the sites had begun to develop neighborhood-based programs, most had focused on 
building capacity to serve homebuyers in general.  As a result, the NeighborWorks organizations 
entered the pilot with different levels of familiarity with neighborhood revitalization and how 
homeownership relates to neighborhood outcomes.  They also presumably had different expectations 
for how participation in the Pilot would affect their organizations. 
 
Neighborhood Reinvestment began the Pilot with a five-day training workshop designed to articulate 
the goals of the demonstration and the theory of neighborhood change.  The Pilot defined a healthy 
neighborhood as “a place where it makes economic sense for people to invest their time, money, and 
energy, and where neighbors manage change successfully.”  The revitalization strategy articulated in 
the Pilot was to strengthen and restore confidence in the neighborhood by encouraging people to 
purchase homes in the neighborhood and existing homeowners to make high-quality improvements.  
The strategy was differentiated from affordable housing in that it focused on increasing demand for 
the neighborhood rather than the supply of housing, offering a range of programs tailored to the 
neighborhood, serving all income groups, and using proactive marketing and physical improvements 
to attract newcomers to the neighborhood.   
 
The revitalization theory was similar to the “weak market” approach described above (in the pilot it 
was referred to as creating “neighborhoods of choice”), although the main focus was on 
homeownership.  During the training workshop, the sites agreed on a set of six measures against 
which the impact of the Pilot would be assessed: resident satisfaction; physical improvements; 
perceptions of the market; investment in residential mortgages; changes in property values; and rates 
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of property vacancy and tax delinquency.  In addition to the portion of the grant set aside for local 
researchers, Neighborhood Reinvestment funded a national evaluation that evaluated individual and 
cross-site results. 
 
According to both the local and national evaluations, the neighborhood level changes that could be 
attributed to the Category B Pilot at the end of the two years were modest.  The national evaluation, 
focused on trends in residential investment and neighborhood changes captured by decennial census 
data, found little impact.  The local evaluations tracked a broader range of outcome measures 
(typically a subset of the six described above) but were either not completed (only baseline data were 
collected) or showed only isolated gains. 
 
Although the pilot yielded few systematic findings on the extent to which homeownership strategies 
can be used to increase resident satisfaction, property values, and investment in neighborhoods, it 
offered some important process lessons.  The main lessons of the Category B pilot, as articulated by 
staff we interviewed at the Neighborhood Reinvestment and NeighborWorks organizations, were as 
follows: 
 
• Two years was too short a time frame to measure the impact of neighborhood 
revitalization strategies on neighborhoods.  Most sites had only just begun to implement 
their strategies by the end of the demonstration program.  In addition, participating 
NeighborWorks organizations had a tendency to target too large an area for revitalization 
given the resources available and time frame for effecting change; 
 
• The pilot was successful in helping some NeighborWorks organizations to begin to 
“regain their neighborhood revitalization focus.”  However, even for these organizations 
the pilot was typically just the first step in a much longer process of moving toward a 
place-based approach and then aligning the organization’s programs and activities with 
the new approach;  
 
• NeighborWorks organizations were selected for the pilot on the basis of their track record 
in homeownership production, not necessarily their engagement with neighborhood 
revitalization.  This selection process may have screened out organizations that were 
ahead of the curve on neighborhood revitalization but were not high producers of 
homeownership assistance. 
 
• One of the most valuable aspects of the pilot from the NeighborWorks organizations’ 
perspective (in addition to the dedicated funding) was the opportunity that it provided for 
the exchange of ideas among participating organizations, for example through the week-
long planning session.  However, the value of this exchange was somewhat limited by 
major differences among the pilot sites in terms of the local market conditions they were 
trying to address. 
 
• NeighborWorks organizations found it difficult to balance evaluation activities (data 
collection and analysis) with program delivery and need to build capacity in this area.  
Without the assistance of outside consultants (funded by the Neighborhood Reinvestment 
for the pilot), it would have been very difficult for the sites to develop baseline data 
against which to measure their progress;  
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• The pilot’s focus on homeownership may have been too prescriptive in that it may have 
limited other kinds of non-housing activities that contribute to neighborhood 
revitalization.  As a result, the next iteration of the pilot has focused on community 
organizing. 
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